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THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE 
Kate Sablosky Elengold 
ABSTRACT  
This Article names and identifies the “investment imperative” 
as the widely-held belief that higher education is necessary to 
increase one’s financial prosperity and social standing in America. 
Increasingly, higher education policy has supported the 
investment imperative by shifting the benefit, burden, and risk of 
higher education from the public to the private consumer. This has 
resulted in a patchwork of laws that encourage education at any 
cost, primarily driven by personal debt, and without concomitant 
regulations that control for instructional quality. 
Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship, empirical studies, 
and original interviews with student loan borrowers across the 
country, this Article argues that the investment imperative drives 
and distorts students’ financial behaviors and decisions. Because 
students are conditioned to see higher education as an imperative 
investment in their own human capital, many fail to connect 
college attendance with college financing. More specifically, this 
Article argues that the investment imperative (1) permits and 
encourages an “ostrich effect,” whereby student borrowers ignore 
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information about higher education institutions and the cost of 
debt; and (2) creates the conditions for a “student debt cascade,” 
whereby the disconnect between the financial promise of higher 
education and the student’s financial reality leads to distress 
emotions, avoidance, nonpayment, and default. Throughout, this 
Article recognizes that, in its implementation, the investment 
imperative leaves students vulnerable to exploitation and ignores 
the effects of systemic inequalities related to race, gender, and 
class. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the founding of this nation, Americans have touted the 
promise of social and economic advancement through hard work.1 
It is the cornerstone of the American Dream. And there is 
widespread belief that, today, higher education is a key to that 
advancement.2 Increasing one’s socioeconomic status has, in fact, 
become so intertwined with higher education that it is difficult to 
separate what this Article names the “investment imperative” 
from individual decisions to seek higher education. 
The investment imperative is the widely-held belief that 
higher education is necessary to increase one’s financial prosperity 
and social standing in America. This Article argues that the 
investment imperative is a driving force behind students’ financial 
behavior and decisions about higher education and student debt, 
often distorting that decision-making. And while higher education 
is not a monolith, and postsecondary students are diverse in every 
measure, the investment imperative surfaces as a theme across 
institutions and students. 
This imperative did not simply emerge out of our culture. 
Higher education policy throughout the last century has supported 
and stoked the investment imperative. Beginning with the Morrill 
Land-Grant Acts, the federal government took an active role in 
higher education.3 One major aim of higher education legislation 
                                                     
 1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 187–88 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Sever & Francis 1862) (1840); see also RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN 
LIFE 27 (1990) (“I learned that hard work is an essential part of life—that by and large, you 
don’t get something for nothing—and that America was a place that offered unlimited 
opportunity to those who did work hard.”). 
 2. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 159 (1st ed. 2006) (“Throughout 
our history, education has been at the heart of a bargain this nation makes with its citizens: 
If you work hard and take responsibility, you’ll have a chance for a better life.”); infra note 
71 and accompanying text. In reality, this is not the case for all of those who seek 
postsecondary education. See TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING 
RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 13–14 (2017) (highlighting the 
financial risks for those who attend for-profit colleges and universities); Katherine Porter, 
College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS 
THE MIDDLE CLASS 85, 85–86 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (explaining that those who have 
“some college,” but no degree, are at a disproportionately high risk for financial failure); 
DARRICK HAMILTON ET AL., UMBRELLAS DON’T MAKE IT RAIN: WHY STUDYING AND WORKING 
HARD ISN’T ENOUGH FOR BLACK AMERICANS 3 (2015), http://insightcced.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2015/08/Umbrellas_Dont_Make_It_Rain_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V4C 
-WKUB] (arguing that education alone does not explain economic well-being, especially 
when viewed across races). 
 3. See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, 
AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 12–14, 86–88 (2016) (tracing the legal history 
of college access legislation, including the Morrill Act of 1862, the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, the report of the Truman Commission in 1947, the National 
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has been to increase access to bolster individual and societal 
advancement.4 That push for increased access to higher 
education—in aggregate terms—has been a success.5 The Morrill 
Act of 1862 led to the creation of forty-eight land-grant colleges6 
and the G.I. Bill, passed in 1944, led to a major increase in 
veterans seeking higher education.7 Each decade since the passage 
of the Higher Education Act in 1965 has brought a significant 
increase in college attendance. At last count, at least twenty 
million American adults were enrolled in some form of higher 
education.8 That number grew by 14 percent in the last decade and 
is expected to increase by almost the same amount in the next 
decade.9 
As this Article details, however, federal higher education 
policy has increasingly treated postsecondary education as a 
private, rather than a public, good. That has led to a patchwork of 
laws that encourage education at ever-increasing costs,10 
                                                     
Defense Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its subsequent 
amendments, the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, and the College Cost 
Reduction and Access Act of 2007). 
 4. Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
1561, 1575–76 (2015) (recognizing that the primary goal of the Higher Education Act was 
to “put college within reach of any student who wanted to go, regardless of that student’s 
means”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., Fact Sheet: Increasing College Access by 
Making Loans Easier to Pay (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact- 
sheet-increasing-college-access-making-loans-easier-pay [https://perma.cc/7URJ-PSDW] 
(“Higher education continues to be the single most important investment students can 
make in themselves and the surest engine to enter the middle class.”).  
 5. But see infra Section II.B for a discussion of those who have been excluded from 
higher education.  
 6. David J. Staley, Democratizing American Higher Education: The Legacy of the 
Morrill Land Grant Act, ORIGINS, Jan. 2013, at 1.  
 7. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC 139–40 (2003) (“Of the more than 15 
million eligible veterans, about half took advantage of these educational benefits: 2.2 
million attended college or post-graduate study, 3.5 million enrolled in other schooling, 1.4 
million chose on-the-job training, and 700,000 sought farm training.”).  
 8. The most comprehensive data on higher education are collected and disseminated 
by the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) National Postsecondary Student 
Aid Study (NPSAS). NCES is a unit of the U.S. Department of Education. The most recent 
data were released in January of 2018, covering 2015–2016. See RADWIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2018-466, 2015–2016 NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT 
AID STUDY (NPSAS:16) (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018466.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/NYZ5-L272] for the most recent NPSAS. These numbers do not account for the more 
than 400,000 adults enrolled in postsecondary-school certificate and nondegree granting 
programs during that time. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2017-
094, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2016, at 399–400 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs 
2017/2017094.pdf [https://perma.cc/67PD-ZSLW]. 
 9. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 399–400. 
 10. In the last decade, the annual cost for one undergraduate year at a public 
nonprofit institution increased by 34 percent and the annual cost for one undergraduate 
year at a private nonprofit institution increased by 26 percent. Id. at 403. For-profit 
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primarily driven by personal debt, and without concomitant 
regulations that control for instructional quality. Access has 
increasingly been supported through the proliferation of 
unsubsidized loans on the front end, a rise in largely unregulated 
postsecondary institutions in the middle, and punitive collection 
tools on the back end.11  
Unsurprisingly, the consumption of higher education under 
the current regulatory framework has problematic consequences. 
Student debt has skyrocketed, delinquency and default are on the 
rise, and students have been left vulnerable to predatory 
institutions. Students are increasingly financing their higher 
education with debt, tapping into both public and private credit 
sources.12 As of May 2019, nearly forty-four million Americans 
were carrying student debt, and the cumulative debt load was 
$1.49 trillion.13 The average balance per borrower now hovers 
around $30,000.14 Not only are more borrowers taking on more 
education debt, but those borrowers are also having increasing 
difficulty repaying their loans. Student loan delinquency now 
                                                     
institutions have had a slightly different history, whereby their costs have decreased over 
the last decade. Id.  
 11. See Daniela Kraiem, The Cost of Opportunity: Student Debt and Social Mobility, 
48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 689, 702–04, 714 (2015) (arguing that higher education policy has 
been driven by an “education is a commodity” metaphor, including the focus on higher 
education as an investment in an individual’s human capital); see also Robert Shireman, 
Learn Now, Pay Later: A History of Income-Contingent Student Loans in the United States, 
671 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 185, 191 (2017) (“Instead of using coercion, 
the United States promotes higher education through exhortation, with the most common 
argument not about the social benefits, but instead about the individual earnings gains 
associated with college degrees.”). 
 12. SALLIE MAE, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 12 (2017), https://www.salliema 
e.com/assets/Research/HAP/HowAmericaPaysforCollege2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5MR 
-NL4U] (detailing data from 2017 that showed that borrowed money accounted for 27 
percent of education costs, which was up from 20 percent the prior year); KEVIN MILLER, 
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, DEEPER IN DEBT: WOMEN AND STUDENT LOANS 11–12 (2017), 
https://www.aauw.org/aauw_check/pdf_download/show_pdf.php?file=deeper-in-debt [https 
://perma.cc/478D-VAMJ].  
 13. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT 
ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/ 
interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2019Q1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG27-E6M9]. 
Different organizations put this number at different amounts. For example, LendEDU 
reports that, as of August 2019, the cumulative student debt load was $1.61 trillion. 
Average Student Loan Debt Statistics for 2019, LENDEDU (Aug. 19, 2019), https://lend 
edu.com/blog/average-student-loan-debt-statistics [https://perma.cc/EBE3-T8SD] (citing 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Student Loans Owned and Securitized, Outstanding, 
FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLOAS [https://perma.cc/LKV9-Z64B?type=image] 
(last updated Aug. 7, 2019)).  
 14. Robert Kelchen, Examining Average Student Loan Balances by State, ROBERT 
KELCHEN (Feb. 1, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/02/01/examining-average-student- 
loan-balances-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/P2PK-57GS] (relying on the most recently-
available data from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid). 
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accounts for the principal kind of household debt default, 
exceeding credit card, mortgage, auto loan, and home equity 
revolving debt.15 
Importantly, these negative effects of student debt 
disproportionally burden women, people of color, members of the 
LGBTQ community, and students from poor families. Women, for 
example, represent 57 percent of college students, but hold two-
thirds of the nation’s student debt.16 Black undergraduates borrow 
more than their White counterparts.17 The most recent federal 
data reflects an astounding figure: 30 percent of Black student 
borrowers owe more than $100,000, compared to just 12 percent of 
their White counterparts.18 And LGBTQ borrowers reported an 
average of $16,000 more student debt than the general 
population.19 In addition to individual circumstances, there are 
                                                     
 15. See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 13. 
This is particularly true for students attending for-profit institutions. See infra notes 117–
19 and accompanying text. 
 16. MILLER, supra note 12, at 1 (“[M]any do not think of student debt as a women’s 
issue despite the fact that women represented 56 percent of those enrolled in American 
colleges and universities in fall 2016. This report reveals that they also take on larger 
student loans than do men. And because of the gender pay gap, they have less disposable 
income with which to repay their loans after graduating from college, so they require more 
time to pay back their student debt than do men. As a result, women hold nearly two-thirds 
of the outstanding student debt in the United States.”).  
 17. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 90; see also SARA GOLDRICK-RAB ET AL., THE 
COLOR OF STUDENT DEBT: IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL LOAN PROGRAM REFORMS FOR BLACK 
STUDENTS AND HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 14–15 (2014), https://ne 
ws.education.wisc.edu/docs/WebDispenser/news-connections-pdf/thecolorofstudentdebt-dr 
aft.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/RQV2-QDZF] (arguing that the racial wealth gap 
explains much of the borrowing discrepancy between Black and White undergraduates); 
MARK HUELSMAN, DEMOS, THE DEBT DIVIDE: THE RACIAL AND CLASS BIAS BEHIND THE 
“NEW NORMAL” OF STUDENT BORROWING 2, 9–10 figs. 2, 3, & 4 (2015), https://www.de 
mos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Mark-Debt%20divide%20Final%20%28SF%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LW6F-7BRV] (depicting data showing that Black and low-income 
students borrow more and more often to finance their undergraduate studies). Cf. Sandy 
Baum, Student Debt: Where Is the Crisis?, 7 UC IRVINE L. REV. 21, 36–37 (2017) (arguing 
that Black undergraduates graduate with higher levels of debt than other racial and ethnic 
groups due to a combination of for-profit enrollment, borrowing at older ages, independence 
from family, longer completion times, lower family income, and lower family wealth). 
 18. Robert Kelchen, Examining Trends in Graduate Student Debt by Race and 
Ethnicity, ROBERT KELCHEN (May 15, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/05/15/examini 
ng-trends-in-graduate-student-debt-by-race-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/T7UZ-J9FN]; 
Robert Kelchen, What Explains Racial Gaps in Large Graduate Student Debt Burdens?, 
ROBERT KELCHEN (May 17, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/05/17/what-expl 
ains-racial-gaps-in-large-graduate-student-debt-burdens/ [https://perma.cc/DHD8-NFJK] 
(finding, through a regression analysis on these data controlling for gender, age, marital 
status, level of study, institution type, and field of study, a strong suggestion that “the 
[B]lack/[W]hite gap in large student debt burdens cannot be explained by other 
demographic characteristics or individuals’ fields of study”). 
 19. Carmen Reinicke, Student Debt Is Crushing Dreams for This Group, CNBC (July 
23, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/20/there-are-added-risks--lgbtq- 
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systemic factors connected to these discrepancies—gender and 
racial income gaps, intergenerational class and race wealth gaps, 
redlining, poor-quality elementary and secondary education and 
counseling, and social and familial rejection, to name a few. 
Further, students who attend for-profit postsecondary 
institutions, which reflect a higher default rate,20 are 
disproportionately female, African American, older, and parents.21 
This Article argues that the investment imperative does not 
simply exist as a matter of form in higher education policy; it is 
also the driving force behind students’ financial behavior and 
decisions around higher education and student debt. By 
prioritizing college attendance above all, the investment 
imperative drives and distorts students’ financial decision-
making. It then leaves students, especially those with limited 
opportunity or significant debt, vulnerable to exploitation. 
This Article identifies and explores two specific decision-
making distortions and their consequences.22 
First, the investment imperative permits and encourages 
students to decouple their decision-making about attendance at an 
institution of higher education from financing that attendance. 
Understanding higher education as a genuine imperative distorts 
a rational cost-benefit analysis. This Article argues that the 
investment imperative thus creates an “ostrich effect,”23 whereby 
                                                     
student-loan-borrowers.html [https://perma.cc/R2Y2-CRBQ] (citing to a study by Student 
Loan Hero of 11,000 student borrowers who identify as LGBTQ). 
 20. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 21. See For-Profit Colleges: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS POSTSECONDARY 
EDUC. & EMP., https://capseecenter.org/research/by-the-numbers/for-profit-college-infogra 
phic/ [https://perma.cc/8NFK-9MEN] (last updated Feb. 2018). In New York’s schools, for 
example, 72 percent of Black for-profit students defaulted on their loans within twelve 
years, relative to 25 percent of their Black peers who attended public and nonprofit New 
York colleges. See YAN CAO, THE CENTURY FOUND., GRADING NEW YORK’S COLLEGES 3 
(2018), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2018/03/26094105/grading-new-yorks- 
colleges.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT97-SXGV]. Both of those numbers are high relative to their 
White peers. Id. White for-profit students defaulted on their loans at a nearly 40 percent 
rate and White nonprofit students defaulted on their loans at a 9 percent rate. Id. 
 22. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the decision-making distortions and 
their consequences. While the normative consequences do not ring true for every student 
borrower, these themes are prevalent enough in quantitative studies, qualitative studies 
(including the one contained herein), and the literature to warrant significant concern and 
further study. 
 23. The “ostrich effect” is used in cognitive science and behavioral economics and 
refers to the preference to focus on positive information and avoid negative information. 
See Peter H. Huang, Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’ 
Thinking About Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 189, 231–32 (2017) (citing Russell 
Golman & George Loewenstein, Curiosity, Information Gaps, and the Utility of Knowledge 
(Apr. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/docs/golman/C 
uriosity%2C%20Information%20Gaps%2C%20and%20the%20Utility%20of%20Knowledge 
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student borrowers ignore the costs of their attendance, fail to seek 
or understand information about the rights and responsibilities 
associated with their loans, fail to seek advice or assistance with 
their loans, and fall prey to scams and misinformation directed at 
chronically under-informed borrowers. 
Second, the investment imperative risks overpromising 
students certain financial outcomes from attaining a college 
certification or degree by instilling overconfidence in their ability 
to repay education debt. This is particularly perilous where 
information asymmetry between lender/institution and student is 
combined with a failure to hold institutions accountable for their 
graduates’ negative outcomes. For many, graduation comes with 
the start of student loan repayment and the shock that, in part 
because of their education debt, borrowers do not have the 
financial stability that the investment imperative promised. This 
causes a “student debt cascade,” wherein the disconnect between 
the financial promise of the investment imperative does not align 
with the graduate’s financial reality, leading to distress emotions 
(i.e., shame and fear), avoidance, and default. This student debt 
cascade has negative financial implications for the borrower, her 
family, and her lender—the American taxpayer.24 
To support these theories, this Article looks to both 
interdisciplinary scholarship and original qualitative data. The 
original data comes from sixty-five in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews from 2017 and 2018 with student borrowers in ten 
American cities. These data, along with the existing literature, are 
                                                     
%20Golman_Loewenstein%20April%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4SL-TGAB]; Geoffrey 
P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex 
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818 (2010) 
(citing Niklas Karlsson et al., The Ostrich Effect: Selective Attention to Information, 38 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 96 (2009)) (“The ostrich effect is the tendency for market actors 
to ignore news, data, or analysis that imply negative outcomes.”). The term was originally 
coined by Dan Galai and Orly Sade. Dan Galai & Orly Sade, The “Ostrich Effect” and the 
Relationship Between the Liquidity and the Yields of Financial Assets, 79 J. BUS. 2741, 
2743–44 (2006) (defining “ostrich effect” as “avoiding apparently risky financial situations 
by pretending they do not exist”). Similar language and constructs have been used in the 
bankruptcy literature. See Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions 
of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319, 1345 (2015) (“The term ‘ostrich defense’ is most 
commonly associated with how individuals tend to approach their increasingly precarious 
finances. . . . [T]hey refuse to deal with their situations because they believe better financial 
times lay ahead or because they simply do not want to admit failure.”); Ronald J. Mann & 
Katherine Porter, Saving up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 313 (2010) (describing 
debtors’ use of avoidance techniques prior to filing for bankruptcy or to deter collection as 
the “ostrich defense”). 
 24. Approximately 90 percent of student loans are federal loans. John R. Brooks, The 
Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding Income-Driven 
Repayment, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 847, 851.  
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used to explain and explore the real effects of the investment 
imperative on students and their families. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II sets out the legal 
history and current facts related to higher education access. It 
traces the investment imperative’s imprint on the law’s push for 
higher education through a series of statutes designed to increase 
access to college. In other words, it sets out how the investment 
imperative has been supported by the supply side—through 
policymaking and by postsecondary institutions. It recognizes the 
overwhelming success of that push, setting forth data both in the 
aggregate and across decades, institutions, degrees, and students. 
Yet it acknowledges that there are those who have been excluded. 
Part II also explores the financial costs of increased access to 
higher education and the ways that financing responsibility has 
shifted from public entities to students and their families. Part III 
traces the existence of the investment imperative on the demand 
side—from the perspective of students. It introduces the original 
qualitative data, layering the data on top of existing 
interdisciplinary research to explore how borrowers experience the 
investment imperative. Part IV then identifies the ways in which 
the investment imperative drives and distorts consumers’ 
decision-making, especially with respect to financing higher 
education. It defines and explores the ostrich effect and the 
student debt cascade as consequences of that distortion. 
Whether the investment imperative is a net positive or a net 
negative is beyond the scope of this Article. The purpose of this 
Article is to name, identify, and explore the investment imperative 
and consider how it has operated to drive policymaking and distort 
consumer decision-making. It makes no claim as to whether access 
to higher education should be an imperative for all Americans. Nor 
should this Article be read as a critique of legislative and other 
efforts to increase access to higher education. Rather, this Article 
evidences how the concept of higher education as an investment 
imperative is affecting the way students think about and finance 
their postsecondary education. And it shows how those effects 
leave students, particularly low-income students, students of 
color, and female students, vulnerable to exploitation. At the end 
of the day, the way that higher education’s investment imperative 
has been adopted, implemented, and exploited disproportionately 
burdens communities that have historically been excluded from 
access to higher education and other forms of wealth development 
and social mobility. 
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II. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE IMPRINT 
Historically, higher education was seen as a public good. 
Beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862, Congress passed a series 
of acts that focused on increasing access to higher education. The 
passage of the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965 represented 
the “high-water mark” for federal legislative support aimed at 
increasing access to higher education.25 Every decade following its 
passage has brought an increase in postsecondary education 
enrollment. The legislative push for access has been largely 
successful, with certain exceptions. But in the decades following 
the HEA, as more and more diverse Americans entered the higher 
education sphere, there was a shift in thinking about higher 
education.26 In the last fifty years, Congressional action can best 
be understood through the lens of the investment imperative,27 a 
perspective that understands higher education as a private, rather 
than a public, good. Changes in funding and collection policies 
have increasingly shifted the benefit, burden, and risk of higher 
education from the public to the private student and her 
household, regulating higher education “as though it were actually 
a real commodity with a single purpose: generating return on 
investment for the individual student in the form of higher 
                                                     
 25. See Glater, supra note 4, at 1575–76; BETH AKERS & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, 
GAME OF LOANS: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF STUDENT DEBT 45 (2016) (“HEA had a 
broad, lasting impact on higher education, including the creation of the first federal grant 
program for college students . . . .”). 
 26. This Article does not argue that the shift in perspective was caused by increased 
numbers of women and people of color entering higher education. Such an argument would 
require a more in-depth study. There were likely multiple causes for the perspective shift, 
including budget deficits fueled by the Vietnam War, an energy crisis in the late 1970s, and 
the personal responsibility sentiment advanced by President Reagan’s economic policies. 
See Camilla E. Watson, The Future of Lower-Income Students in Higher Education: 
Rethinking the Pell Program and Federal Tax Incentives, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1109–
10, 1114, 1116–17 (2018); see also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: 
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 129–30 (2003) 
(“This shift in funding priorities was driven in part by an ideological shift during the 
Reagan era. Higher education was presented as a private benefit to be financed by the 
individual, instead of a public good to be funded by the government.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 27. The investment imperative is the cousin of the “education gospel” and the 
“education is a commodity” metaphor. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining economist 
W. Norton Grubb’s and historian Marvin Lazerson’s “education gospel” as “our faith in 
education as moral, personally edifying, collectively beneficial, and a worthwhile 
investment no matter the cost, either individual or societal”); Kraiem, supra note 11, at 690 
(arguing that America has adopted an “education is a commodity” metaphor that offers 
college as “an investment in [one’s] own human capital” and a “necessity” such that student 
consumers “must shop around for the best return on investment”); see also Rachel E. Dwyer 
et al., Youth Debt, Mastery, and Self-Esteem: Class-Stratified Effects of Indebtedness on 
Self-Concept, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 727, 729 (2011) (citing studies that suggest that a college 
degree is “an investment in human capital that is crucial to improving one’s life chances”). 
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wages.”28 As detailed below, the last half-century of federal higher 
education policymaking has largely maintained a commitment to 
access initiatives, although without related institutional 
accountability measures, and tied to more onerous terms and 
punitive collection tools.  
A. Early Legislative Push for Access 
In the early days of the republic, the nation’s commitment to 
education was in service of both individual advancement and 
broader democratic values.29 In 1862 and 1890, Congress 
maintained that sense with the passage of the Morrill Acts, 
creating land-grant universities in the United States.30 Taken 
together, the Morrill Acts were based on the principles that higher 
education should be accessible and practical.31 Senator Justin 
Smith Morrill argued that agriculture in the United States was 
deteriorating and that “[i]mproving the skills and knowledge of 
farmers was the best method to reverse this decline.”32 After 
several failed attempts, Morrill convinced his colleagues that the 
public good of education was equal to the value of the public lands 
the government would give up to fund land-grant schools in every 
state.33  
More than half a century later, the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as the G.I. Bill, once 
again changed the higher education landscape.34 The G.I. Bill 
offered returning World War II veterans a “year of full-time tuition 
or training plus a period equal to their length of service up to forty-
                                                     
 28. Kraiem, supra note 11, at 690. 
 29. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 125–27 (describing Jefferson’s 1819 founding of the 
University of Virginia and concluding that “the historical guiding principle of both public 
and private universities has been to educate people who would then better serve society as 
workers, citizens, and leaders”). 
 30. First Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–309 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); Second Morrill Act, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–328 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); see also Staley, supra note 6 
(detailing the First and Second Morrill Acts). 
 31. Staley, supra note 6. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284; Charles R. 
Jonas, Reemployment and Readjustment Rights of Veterans, 23 N.C. L. REV. 107, 115 
(1945). 
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eight months, along with subsistence pay for” all veterans and 
male veterans’ dependents.35 President Roosevelt explained: 
But after the war shall have been won, the best way that we 
can repay a portion of that debt is to see to it, by planning 
and by action now, that those men and women are 
demobilized into an economy which is sound and prosperous, 
with a minimum of unemployment and dislocation; and that, 
with the assistance of Government, they are given the 
opportunity to find a job for which they are fitted and 
trained, in a field which offers some reasonable assurance of 
well-being and continuous employment. For many, what 
they desire most in the way of employment will require 
special training and further education. . . . [T]he Nation is 
morally obligated to provide this training and education and 
the necessary financial assistance by which they can be 
secured.36 
The G.I. Bill was followed by the National Defense Education Act 
of 1958, which endorsed funding, including student loans, for 
science, math, engineering, and foreign language programs.37 
Less than a decade later, Congress passed the Higher 
Education Act of 1965.38 Its primary goal was to allow any student 
who wanted postsecondary education to be able to access that 
education.39 The HEA created a financial structure to allow more 
students to pay for college by providing for grants, loans, and 
work-study programs.40 It created a guaranteed student loan 
                                                     
 35. COHEN, supra note 7, at 139.  
 36. Message to Congress on the Education of War Veterans, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odgiced.html [https://per 
ma.cc/7NF2-DMRS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 37. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, 
at 46. 
 38. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 39. Id.; see also Glater, supra note 4, at 1575–76 (describing the primary goals of the 
HEA). 
 40. Higher Education Act of 1965 §§ 201, 421, 441. The HEA has been reauthorized 
and/or amended eight times, in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. Higher 
Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, 82 Stat. 1014; Education Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235; Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
482, 90 Stat. 2081; Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367; 
Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268; Higher 
Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448; Higher Education 
Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581; Higher Education Opportunity 
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008). 
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program,41 recognizing the dual public and private interest in 
higher education: 
I believe fully in the principle . . . that no boy or girl who can 
benefit from a college education should be denied the 
opportunity because of financial disability. When we pass 
this bill we will be helping them, it is true, but we shall be 
helping ourselves as a nation fully as much. Our young 
people are our future, and the Nation a generation hence will 
be dependent upon them. This is seed money, and the fruit it 
bears will become apparent only later, when the student 
generation now in our colleges has become the adult 
leadership generation of the future.42 
Early amendments supported the provision of grant dollars to 
support the access initiative. Importantly, the 1972 amendments 
gave us the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant, later renamed 
the Pell Grant, which offered low-income students no-cost access 
to higher education.43 The 1978 HEA amendments, known as the 
Middle Income Student Assistance Act, expanded the grant 
program to include middle-income students.44 Primarily beginning 
with the Reagan Administration and as set forth below, Congress 
continued the push for higher education access, but it was 
maintained against the backdrop of the investment imperative.45 
Congress continues to tinker with higher education policy. Today, 
the 116th Congress is debating a major overhaul of the Higher 
Education Act.46 
                                                     
 41. The guaranteed loan program later became known as “Stafford Loans” and is 
sometimes referred to as “Title IV funding” in reference to its location in the HEA. Augustus 
F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 2601, 102 Stat. 130, 330. 
 42. 89 CONG. REC. 22,615 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hartke). 
 43. Education Amendments of 1972, sec. 131, § 401; see also Trio Programs, PELL 
INST., http://www.pellinstitute.org/ed.shtml [https://perma.cc/96SM-93PM] (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2019). The Pell Grant increased access to higher education to low-income students 
by providing $1,200 annually to be used like a voucher at the student’s chosen college or 
university. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 13. The 1972 amendments, however, also 
opened up Title IV funding to proprietary (for-profit) institutions. Education Amendments 
of 1972, sec. 102(a)(1), § 417B (including proprietary institutions in definition of “institution 
of higher education”). 
 44. Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 45. See infra Section II.C. 
 46. See Higher Education, EDUC. & LAB. COMMITTEE, https://edlabor.house.gov/issue 
s/education/higher-education [https://perma.cc/4XAC-QY9G] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
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B. The Access Initiative Finds Great Success 
For the most part, the government’s legislative push to 
increase access to higher education has been successful, when 
viewed both over time and in aggregate raw numbers.47 
Approximately half of the fifteen million World War II 
veterans enrolled in postsecondary education or training using 
their G.I. benefits.48 Prior to 1940, only 10 percent of Americans 
sought higher education; by 1948, that number grew by 50 percent 
and continued to climb, with “vets [making up] half the 
undergraduate population.”49 And the HEA has had a profound 
effect on access to higher education.50 Between 1961 and 1969, 
higher education enrollment increased by 93 percent.51 And, today, 
the aggregate numbers are impressive. At last count, at least 
twenty million American adults were enrolled in a degree-
granting higher education program.52 Today, 63 percent of 
Americans in their late twenties reported some college, compared 
to 53 percent just two decades ago; those with a bachelor’s degree 
increased from 24 percent to 34 percent.53 
Access to higher education has increased across many 
segments of the population and across various institutions. In the 
wake of the civil rights and women’s rights movements, more 
women and people of color entered higher education.54 In the 
thirteen years between 1970 and 1983, undergraduate enrollment 
                                                     
 47. The passage of federal legislation is not the only motivator for increased 
participation in higher education. Key pieces of higher education legislation were passed 
amidst the political and social backdrop of World War II, the civil rights movement, the 
women’s rights movement, and an influx of immigration. One cannot separate the policy 
from the political context. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 12–13 (“In the 1960s, when 
federal financial aid policy was first formulated, the nation was in the midst of a period of 
economic growth and security, declining poverty, and great social change. Women, African 
Americans, immigrants, and working-class [W]hite people were all clamoring for a shot at 
middle-class jobs and the American dream, and politicians in Washington wanted to 
help. . . . Providing access to higher education was a clear and seemingly fair way to do 
that.”); Guinier, supra note 26, at 127–28 (noting that legal challenges and social 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s opened the door to higher education to previously 
excluded students, including women and people of color). 
 48. COHEN, supra note 7, at 139–40 (“Of the more than 15 million eligible veterans, 
about half took advantage of these educational benefits: 2.2 million attended college or post-
graduate study, 3.5 million enrolled in other schooling, 1.4 million chose on-the-job training, 
and 700,000 sought farm training.”).  
 49. Id. at 140. 
 50. Watson, supra note 26, at 1112–13. 
 51. Id. at 1113 n.29. 
 52. Fast Facts: Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfact 
s/display.asp?id=98 [https://perma.cc/DCK3-SXWU] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 53. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 40. 
 54. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 127–28. 
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increased 47 percent, and rose another 18 percent by 1992.55 In the 
decade between 2004–2005 and 2014–2015, the number of 
bachelor’s degrees awarded to male students increased by 33 
percent and to female students increased by 31 percent.56 During 
that same time period, White students saw a 15 percent increase 
in bachelor’s degrees, Black students saw a 42 percent increase, 
Hispanic students saw a 115 percent increase, and Asian/Pacific 
Islander students saw a 38 percent increase.57 The aggregate 
number of degrees increased dramatically across all levels: the 
number of associate’s degrees increased by 46 percent, the number 
of bachelor’s degrees increased by 32 percent, the number of 
master’s degrees increased by 31 percent, and the number of 
doctorate degrees increased by 33 percent between 2004–2005 and 
2014–2015.58 
On average, higher education credentials translate into better 
economic circumstances. Numerous studies, “using a variety of 
methodologies[,] have consistently found that the economic 
returns to college are positive and large.”59 One study from 
Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the Workforce 
found that workers with a bachelor’s degree earn almost one 
million dollars more over the course of their lifetimes than workers 
without a degree.60 
The access initiative has not, however, been universally 
successful or without concern. Many remain excluded from the 
higher education system altogether.61 The G.I. Bill, for example, 
                                                     
 55. Fast Facts: Enrollment, supra note 52. 
 56. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 9. 
 57. Id. Although racial minority groups saw gains during this period, the gains have 
not achieved parity among racial groups in attaining bachelor’s degrees. “In 2014[–]15, 
White students earned 67 percent of all bachelor’s degrees . . . , Black students earned 11 
percent . . . , Hispanic students earned 12 percent . . . , and Asian/Pacific Islander students 
earned about 7 percent.” Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 69–70 (citing multiple studies); see also 
Robert Kelchen, Student Loans: A Brief History, the Current Landscape, and Impacts on 
Society, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 173, 191 (Joseph L. DeVitis & Pietro A. Sasso 
eds., 2016) (citing studies and concluding that “it is likely that the majority of students will 
benefit from attending college even after taking student loan debt into account”). 
 60. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 69–70; see also John R. Brooks, Income-
Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 249 
(2016) (citing economists who have concluded that “investing in higher education has 
consistently been one of the best forms of investment around . . . .”). But see AKERS & 
CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 70 (stating that while the studies consistently show that college 
graduates earn more, on average, than those without college degrees, it is not necessarily 
because their earnings skyrocket; rather, it is “driven in large part by the declining earnings 
among workers without college degrees”). 
 61. See Brooks, supra note 60, at 238 (“[T]he data show that there is still a significant 
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not only offered returning veterans access to higher education, it 
also displaced women who would have otherwise accepted those 
spots.62 And today, for students from low-income families, the data 
show that college remains largely out of reach. Among those who 
graduate from high school, only one in two children from families 
in the bottom one-fifth of the income distribution enrolls in higher 
education.63 And for those who do make it to college, their 
experiences are varied and unequal.64 For those low-income 
students who do enroll in higher education, data suggest that the 
drop-out rate is 38 percent.65 And the disproportionate number of 
Black and Hispanic students who come from low-income families 
suggests that higher education remains limited for students from 
those racial and ethnic backgrounds.66 
C. With Great Access Comes Individual Responsibility 
In the last fifty years, the investment imperative has emerged 
as a touchstone of federal higher education policy. Driven by a 
combination of increased numbers of Americans seeking access to 
higher education, increased higher education costs, state 
disinvestment, and a strong personal responsibility rhetoric, 
Congress began treating higher education as a private, rather 
than a public, good. 
Although federal legislation is never an easy-to-plot line,67 
this Section details four primary features of the recent higher 
education landscape that reflect the strength of the investment 
imperative. First, Congress continued access expansion by 
extending loans to additional categories of people and allowing 
individual borrowers to borrow more. Second, the loan expansion 
occurred primarily through unsubsidized loans, which are less 
                                                     
barrier to higher education for students from low-income families . . . .”); Glater, supra note 
4, at 1590 (explaining that the prospect of borrowing large amounts of money may deter 
some students from applying to or enrolling in college). 
 62. COHEN, supra note 7, at 140. 
 63. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 72. 
 64. See infra Section IV.A.3 (discussing for-profit institutions).  
 65. HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 15. 
 66. Research shows that nearly 40 percent of Black borrowers drop out, compared 
with 29 percent of White borrowers. Id. at 15–16.  
 67. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 87 (“The history of federal student aid since its 
inception has been a series of ebbs and flows, periods of generosity and periods of cuts, all 
while college costs continued to rise. Support for helping economically vulnerable students 
like ours secure a better future through higher education has been inconsistent, leaving 
their opportunities subject to a volatile mix of politics and economics. In the midst of it all, 
students are simply trying to get ahead.”). 
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generous to borrowers than subsidized loans.68 Third, Congress 
declined to connect access initiatives to institutional 
accountability metrics, opening the door for the recent explosion of 
for-profit colleges and universities. And fourth, at the same time 
that Congress expanded the menu of education loans, it made it 
more difficult for those borrowers who could not repay their loans. 
While these features are arguably in contradiction with one 
another, the investment imperative connects them all.69 Because 
higher education is imperative, individuals will seek it out at all 
costs. And investment in higher education’s “safe bet” justifies 
both the punitive collection policies and the sluggish motivation 
for government regulation.70 
It is important to note that broad access to higher education 
has remained a potent driving force in higher education 
policymaking. In 2009, for example, Barack Obama told the 
American people, “[T]onight, I ask every American to commit to at 
least one year or more of higher education or career training. . . . 
[W]hatever the training may be, every American will need to get 
more than a high school diploma.”71 
Yet, the financing of that access has increasingly been offered 
through loans, rather than grants. The greatest increase has come 
in the form of unsubsidized loans, which have higher interest rates 
than subsidized loans and accrue interest from the disbursement 
of the loan, even when the student is enrolled in school. In 1968, 
Congress raised the interest rate in an effort to “tighten up [the 
HEA] program” by offering loans that “will not provide for an 
                                                     
 68. Unsubsidized loans may carry a higher interest rate than subsidized loans and 
begin to accrue interest as soon as they are disbursed. Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, 
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized [htt 
ps://perma.cc/S4S4-TXYA] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). In contrast, students do not pay 
interest on subsidized loans while engaged in at least half-time education and during a 
short grace period after graduation. Id. 
 69. Other scholars have used different lenses through which to view the legislature’s 
shift from viewing higher education as a public good to viewing it as a private good. See, 
e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Reforming the Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 36 VA. TAX 
REV. 83 (2017) (arguing that politics, a changing economy, and a congressional enmity to 
students has driven the legislative policy shift on higher education). This can be read in 
conjunction with the investment imperative.  
 70. WALTER W. MCMAHON, TIAA-CREF INST., THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 2, 7 (2010), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/sites/default/files/presentat 
ions/2017-02/ahe_privatesocial0310c.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ4H-6USZ] (stating that 
lawmakers are unlikely to conclude that there is a need for greater governmental 
intervention to make college more available without an understanding of the widespread 
public benefits of higher education).  
 71. President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009) 
(transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-pre 
sident-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress [https://perma.cc/YQ5L-AFDM]).  
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interest subsidy during the repayment period.”72 As Congress 
decreased grant amounts and increased access to unsubsidized 
loans, by 1981, loan dollars topped grant dollars as the prevailing 
form of federal aid.73 The Student Financial Assistance Technical 
Amendments Act of 1982 restricted the Pell Grant award and 
“revised the need-based criteria for [supplemental educational 
opportunity grants], work-study grants, and direct loans.”74 The 
1992 HEA amendments then created an unsubsidized federal loan 
portfolio, increased loan limits, and eliminated borrowing limits 
on Parent PLUS loans.75 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 cut 
$12.7 billion from higher education financial aid.76 At the same 
time, Congress added another category of loans—Graduate PLUS 
loans, which allowed individuals to take on additional 
unsubsidized federal loans at a higher interest rate for graduate 
studies.77 
As Congress expanded access to (mostly unsubsidized) 
education loans, it failed to tie those federal dollars to 
accountability measures for the beneficiary postsecondary 
institutions.78 While institutions must meet certain requirements 
to maintain access to federal loan dollars, including accreditation 
by an agency recognized by the Department of Education,79 such 
                                                     
 72. 90 CONG. REC. 23,111 (1968) (statement of Rep. Meeds) (explaining the purpose 
was to “increase the volume of loans”). 
 73. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 48–49, 49 fig.3.4. This does not account for 
scholarships provided by institutions and private sources. 
 74. Student Financial Assistance Technical Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
301, 96 Stat. 1400; Watson, supra note 26, at 1117. But see id. (discussing the 1986 HEA 
amendments, which increased the Pell Grant award and extended the Perkins Loan for the 
lowest-income students, among implementing other changes). 
 75. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 47. Parent PLUS loans refer to a loan 
program for parents of undergraduates, which was first created in 1980. Id. at 22. These 
legislative choices were made, at least in part, to counter a sense that HEA programs had 
“literally spun out of control.” 102 CONG. REC. 6846 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gordon).  
 76. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); Watson, 
supra note 26, at 1124. 
 77. Deficit Reduction Act, sec. 8005(c), § 428(b). Then, in 2010, Congress passed the 
Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“SAFRA”), which acted to make the federal 
government, through the Department of Education, the primary direct lender of education 
debt and changed and expanded income-based repayment options. See Brooks, supra note 
24, at 851–53. 
 78. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 16–17 (discussing how federal student aid 
flows to colleges and universities without any concomitant requirement that the colleges 
and universities commit to affordability or quality); Kraiem, supra note 11, at 691 (noting 
that the HEA has been “entirely ineffective in terms of protecting both public and private 
investment in higher education”). 
 79. ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43826, AN OVERVIEW OF 
ACCREDITATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R43826.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DZ4-Y6CB].  
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metrics provide little real accountability. Accreditation, which can 
be governed by regional, national, or programmatic accrediting 
agencies, is a poor marker of institutional quality because it does 
not account for graduation rates, retention rates, job placement 
rates, or student performance in skills assessments.80 And 
although institutions can lose access to federal financial aid 
dollars if their graduates’ default rates are exceedingly high,81 
default rates do not adequately measure students’ ability to repay 
or the quality of the education received, in part because the 
calculation of default rates ignores long-term ability to repay and 
can be easily manipulated.82 Inadequate accountability measures 
account for one significant cause of the recent proliferation of for-
profit colleges and universities. A recent push for deregulation of 
the higher education industry projects a future of further quality-
control slippage.83 The recent move by Education Secretary Betsy 
DeVos to formally rescind the “gainful employment rule”84 that 
was enacted by the Obama Administration to hold to account the 
for-profit-college industry, for example, will limit the pressure on 
those institutions to prove the value of their programs through 
student outcome metrics.85 
Finally, we see Congress’s institution of a series of punitive 
collection policies. Before 1978, for example, student loan debts 
                                                     
 80. Id. at 2–4, 17. 
 81. Kelchen, supra note 59, at 189 (explaining that colleges can lose access to 
financial aid if their three-year cohort default rate exceeds 40% in the most recent year or 
more than 30% in three consecutive years). 
 82. See id. (arguing that the default statistics are an imperfect measure because they 
only include the first three years of repayment, which ignores long-term outcomes, and 
because students might be in income-driven repayment plans that allow a student to pay 
little or no money on her loan without going into default); Andrew Kreighbaum, GAO: 
Colleges, Consultants Game Rules to Lower Default Rates, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 27, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/27/gao-finds-colleges-manipulating- 
loan-default-rates-keep-access-federal-aid [https://perma.cc/KH7L-TL3T] (citing U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-163, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: ACTIONS NEEDED 
TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF SCHOOLS’ DEFAULT RATES (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets 
/700/691520.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGV6-L6XY], which details how some colleges were 
“gaming” the cohort default statistics by pushing graduates into forbearance to lower the 
institutions’ default statistics). 
 83. See Eric Kelderman, Era of Deregulation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/DeVos-Has-Nixed-Several/242664 [https://perma.cc/J5A 
V-NDNL] (tracking Betsy DeVos’s deregulation activities in her first year as Secretary of 
the Department of Education). 
 84. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 84 Fed. Reg. 31,392 (July 1, 2019) (to 
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 600, 668).  
 85. Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos Issues Final Repeal of Gainful Employment, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (July 2, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/07/02 
/devos-issues-final-repeal-gainful-employment [https://perma.cc/JX6Z-6H7P]. 
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were dischargeable in bankruptcy like other unsecured credit.86 In 
1978, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to limit the 
discharge of education debt in the first five years only to a debtor 
establishing “undue hardship.”87 Representative Thornton, in 
1976, explained the rationale: “The discharge in bankruptcy of 
student loans is an important contributing factor to the feelings of 
dissatisfaction and frustration about these programs, and many 
people are alarmed about the possibility of increasing numbers of 
students taking advantage of the escape hatch provided by the 
Bankruptcy law.”88 Other lawmakers pointed to the integrity of 
the student loan program, arguing that allowing debtors to 
discharge their education loans in bankruptcy will limit the 
education loans that can be made to future students.89 
Congress continued to make discharging education debt in 
bankruptcy more difficult by extending the exemption to seven 
years in 1990, extending the exemption to the life of the debt in 
1998,90 and, finally, extending the exemption to all education 
loans, including private loans, in 2005.91 Not only did Congress 
eliminate a debtor’s option to use the consumer bankruptcy system 
to discharge education debt,92 Congress simultaneously instituted 
a number of punitive collection tools for outstanding federal 
student debt.93 The 1992 HEA Amendments removed the statute 
                                                     
 86. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan 
Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 363 (2013). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1066 (1976) 
(statement of Rep. Thornton).  
 89. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 1792 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ertel).  
 90. Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans Under 
11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2004). 
 91. The change was made through the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from 
Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 178 
(2017) (exploring the stated rationale for BAPCPA—that increased creditor rights would 
translate to lower interest rates and greater access for students). 
 92. For a full exploration of Congress’s treatment of student debtors under the 
Bankruptcy Code, see Austin, supra note 86, at 410 (“By making education debt 
nondischargeable, Congress has linked student loan default together with offenses such as 
fraud, willful injury, and failure to pay child support.”). 
 93. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 565 (2002) (“When the government itself is the 
unsecured creditor, the legal system provides particularly potent assistance. The 
government has unique collection tools (such as imposing tax liens), and continuously 
searches for new methods of getting now-impecunious borrowers to pay taxes or to honor 
other government obligations.”). 
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of limitations for federal collections.94 Then, with the passage of 
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Congress gave the 
federal government unfettered rights to collect from student 
borrowers by “removing any federal or state statutory, regulatory, 
or administrative limitation on loan collections and authorizing 
the garnishment of wages and Social Security benefits.”95 
D. Increased Access Supported by the Investment Imperative 
Comes at a Cost 
As the investment imperative took hold in federal 
policymaking, college costs were also rising at unprecedented 
rates. That means that the spending power of the Pell Grant and 
other scholarships declined. Therefore, students turned more and 
more to credit to finance their higher education. With the 
combination of federal policy aimed at increasing access to loan 
dollars, rising costs of education, and fewer state dollars covering 
those costs, it is no wonder that aggregate student education debt 
has exploded in the last fifty years. 
Over the last fifty years, higher education has become much 
more expensive. Between the 1970s and mid-2010s, tuition and 
fees at higher education institutions greatly outpaced inflation; 
researchers have found that between 1971–1972 and 2014–2015, 
tuition and fees outpaced inflation by 191 percent at private four-
year colleges, by 198 percent at public two-year colleges, and by 
265 percent at public four-year colleges.96 Adjusted for inflation, 
the average annual net price for a public four-year college has 
increased by approximately $2,100 since 1990; the annual cost for 
a private four-year college has increased by approximately $3,500 
in the same time.97 For traditionally low-cost public institutions, 
that dollar increase represents a 111 percent increase in the last 
three decades.98 The cost increase can be traced to a number of 
                                                     
 94. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1551, 106 Stat. 
448, 838. 
 95. C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of Higher 
Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 82 (2007); see e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2012) (allowing debt 
collection to be occur without regard to any state, local, or federal statute of limitations).  
 96. Kelchen, supra note 59, at 173 (citing SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, TRENDS IN 
COLLEGE PRICING 3, 10 (The College Board ed., 2014)). While students may not necessarily 
pay the list price for their education due to scholarships and tuition remission, in just the 
fifteen years between 1995–1996 and 2011–2012 acdemic years, the median net price 
students paid increased by almost 24 percent, after adjusting for inflation. Id. at 174.  
 97. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 50–51.  
 98. Id. at 51; see also GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that, in the last 
generation, public colleges and universities have seen their state budget allocations 
slashed; on average, those institutions have seen a decline in state dollars from 75 percent 
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factors, including state disinvestment in higher education, 
increased demand for higher education, and increased costs of 
services provided at institutions of higher education.99 Without 
sufficient state financial support, and in the face of increased 
demand and increased costs, institutions have passed the costs on 
to individual students and their families. Those families are 
increasingly turning to debt to finance higher education.100 In a 
2017 study, students aged 18 to 24 and their families reported that 
they borrowed to pay for 27 percent of higher education, up from 
only 20 percent just one year prior.101 Today, after accounting for 
grant dollars, three-fourths of students’ families pay more than 20 
percent of their annual income toward higher education and low-
                                                     
of operating budget to 50 percent of operating budget). 
 99. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 56–57. The reason why college costs have 
risen so dramatically is the subject of some scholarly debate. Cf. id. at 54–60; DANIEL D. 
POLSBY, UNDERSTANDING THE RUNAWAY TUITION PHENOMENON: CREDENCE GOODS IN AN 
AGE OF SKEPTICISM (2017), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_pa 
pers/1710.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC37-SDR4]. Polsby argues that the Bennett hypothesis is 
the only legitimate explanation for the rise in college tuition. The Bennett hypothesis, 
named for former Secretary of Education William Bennett, posits that tuition increases are 
directly linked to federal government subsidies for higher education. In other words, the 
more grant and loan dollars that the government makes available, the more schools will 
charge. Id. at 4–5. Robert Kelchen, on the other hand, argues that, when one runs the 
numbers, there is less evidence to support the Bennett hypothesis than one might think, at 
least in professional education programs. See Robert Kelchen, Does the Bennett Hypothesis 
Hold in Professional Education? An Empirical Analysis, RES. HIGHER EDUC. 1, https://link.s 
pringer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11162-019-09557-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B8V-SSH 
7] (finding “little consistent evidence to support the Bennett [h]ypothesis” in either business 
or medical school); Robert Kelchen, Is There Evidence of the Bennett Hypothesis in Legal 
Education?, ROBERT KELCHEN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://robertkelchen.com/2017/11/08/benn 
ett-hypothesis-legal-education/ [https://perma.cc/M52H-7R34]. This Article does not 
generally weigh in on the supply side of the increased costs of higher education, which 
would require an interrogation of the Bennett hypothesis and other explanations for rising 
tuition costs. Rather, it is focused on the demand side of the equation, exploring whether 
and how the investment imperative distorts consumer decision-making with respect to 
attending and financing higher education. It does recognize, however, that there is a 
relationship between the supply side of education, the investment imperative, and 
consumers’ decision-making. To the extent that rising tuition costs do not translate to better 
economic (or noneconomic) outcomes, there is an increased cost for a decreased value. We 
see this, without question, in the for-profit industry. See infra notes 227–31 and 
accompanying text (discussing the allegations of ineffective educational services with 
regard to for-profit colleges). To take that a step further, such a disconnect is deeply 
connected to and distorted by the near mythological belief in higher education as a 
necessary investment. To the extent that the cultural belief in the investment imperative 
is outdated, its continued hold on prospective students exacerbates the distortions 
identified in Part IV and opens vulnerable students to further exploitation. 
 100. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that state disinvestment in public 
higher education “fueled the declining purchasing power of the Pell [Grant] and the need 
for so many middle-class families to turn to student loans”); Glater, supra note 4, at 1577–
78 (tracing the increase in student borrowing to a combination of grant aid that has lagged 
behind need, stagnated household incomes, and increased tuition).  
 101. SALLIE MAE, supra note 12, at 2, 12. 
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income families making less than $16,000 per year pay 84 percent 
of their income to support their children’s higher education.102 For 
the 39 percent of undergraduates who receive a Pell Grant,103 the 
great majority find the grant insufficient to meet the high cost of 
higher education; today, 90 percent of Pell Grant recipients 
graduate with debt.104 Debt-to-income ratios reflect the class 
disparities; “low-income families hold student debt amounting to 
about 70 percent of their income, while wealthier families have 
student debt amounting to around 10 percent of income (a rate 
deemed manageable by the financial industry).”105 
In the 1980s, annual student borrowing increased five-fold 
from a decade prior, to approximately $22 billion in present-day 
dollars.106 And by the mid-2010s, annual borrowing increased five-
fold again, to more than $100 billion.107 In the last twenty years, 
U.S. households aged 20 to 40 have witnessed an almost two-fold 
increase in education debt, from 20 to 38 percent.108 Looking just 
at those households with debt, the average outstanding debt has 
risen from $8,300 to $21,000.109 Today, aggregate student debt is 
closing in on $1.5 trillion, more than double its count a decade 
prior.110 The most recent official data show that 36 percent of 
undergraduate students received federal loans in 2015–2016, with 
31 percent taking subsidized loans and 30 percent saddled with 
unsubsidized loans.111 Education debt has long-term effects on 
borrowers’ financial well-being; a 2013 report found that a 
household with student debt stands to lose $208,000 over a 
lifetime relative to a household without debt.112 
As costs have risen and increasingly been borne by individual 
students and their families, the levels of default have also risen. 
                                                     
 102. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 5. 
 103. RADWIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.  
 104. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 5, 17 (noting that the “maximum Pell [Grant] 
covers less than one-third of the cost of attending a public four-year college or university 
and barely 60 percent of the cost of attending a community college”). 
 105. Id. at 94. 
 106. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 40.  
 109. Id.  
 110. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 13, at 3. 
 111. RADWIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 5. This is an increase from 26 percent of 
undergraduates who borrowed to pay for college in the 1995–1996 academic year. Kelchen, 
supra note 59, at 181. 
 112. ROBERT HILTONSMITH, AT WHAT COST? HOW STUDENT DEBT REDUCES LIFETIME 
WEALTH 9 (2013), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/AtWhatCost.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/D289-NAZ4] (concluding the discrepancy is largely due to retirement 
savings). 
 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) 
24 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:1 
The current rate of default on federal loans is 10 percent— 
“representing 475,000 students in a single cohort who defaulted 
within only two years of entering repayment . . . .”113 Although 
many borrowers are able to manage their student debt, there is 
consensus that certain communities and borrowers are especially 
vulnerable to default. The greatest risk for defaulting on a loan is 
failure to obtain a degree.114 Further, unmanageable student debt 
“clusters at” certain variables, including low-dollar loans, for-
profit student borrowers, low-income borrowers, female borrowers, 
Black borrowers, and borrowers with dependent family members 
(parents or children).115 Older borrowers are also at risk; almost 
“40 percent of federal student loan borrowers aged 65 and older 
are in default” on their loans.116 
For students attending for-profit institutions, an area of rapid 
growth in the 1990s and 2000s, the statistics are particularly grim. 
By 2009, the default rate for students attending for-profit colleges 
had reached 47 percent.117 For example, in a study of New York 
postsecondary institutions, the Century Foundation found: (1) a 
majority of students at 38 percent of for-profit schools left school 
“with earnings below those of an average worker with only a high 
school diploma,” and (2) almost half of for-profit students defaulted 
on their federal loans within twelve years, which is more than four 
times the rate of their peers.118 The most recent data, which 
                                                     
 113. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 101 (calling the default rate a “national 
tragedy”). A “cohort default rate measures the percentage of students who borrowed, left 
college in a given year, and defaulted on their loans within a given period of time.” Kelchen, 
supra note 59, at 188. For federal loans, a default occurs after nonpayment for 270 days. 
Many more student borrowers are delinquent on their loans, meaning that they have failed 
to repay for some period less than nine months. For example, in 2014, of the nearly 350 
billion federal dollars that should be in repayment (excluding those in deferment and 
forbearance), only 72 percent of the dollars was in on-time repayment; “$40.6 billion [was] 
delinquent between 31 and 180 days, $14 billion [was] delinquent more than 180 days, and 
. . . $40.1 billion [was] in default.” Id.  
 114. See Kelchen, supra note 59, at 189–90 (noting that in the 2003–2004 school year, 
those who failed to complete a degree were responsible for more than 60 percent of the 
defaults by 2009). 
 115. Kraiem, supra note 11, at 699–700. 
 116. PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PUSHED INTO POVERTY: HOW STUDENT 
LOAN COLLECTIONS THREATEN THE FINANCIAL SECURITY OF OLDER AMERICANS 3 (2017), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/student_loans/student-loan-collections-threaten-fin-sec.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BZ7C-CSNY]. 
 117. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 102–03 (describing the statistics for students 
five years into repayment). 
 118. CAO, supra note 21, at 3. Those data are not unique; for-profit institutions have 
come under fire from Congress and advocates for failing their students and engaging in 
widespread schemes of misrepresentation and fraud. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, 
EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO 
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS (2012), https://  
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provide more of a long-term view, suggest that more than half of 
for-profit college students default on their loans.119 
For those borrowers in default, they face yet another huge 
cost—the punitive collection policies instituted by Congress to 
collect on federal debt. In addition to facing no statute of 
limitations on collection,120 the federal government can rely on a 
host of punitive collection tools that include administrative wage 
garnishment, tax return seizure, Social Security offsets, and 
diminished Earned Income Tax Credits, among others.121 Many 
states are also policing default at the behest of the federal 
government; nineteen states allow for professional licenses to be 
revoked and one revokes driver’s licenses for debtors who default 
on education loans.122 Borrowers are also subject to the costs and 
fees of collection, which are added to the principal of their loan.123 
And, as discussed above, with rare exception, a debtor’s education 
loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.124 Higher education 
policymaking has written the investment imperative—through its 
preoccupation with access and treatment of higher education as a 
private good—into the law. The next Part will investigate how that 
has affected consumers.125 
                                                     
www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf [h 
ttps://perma.cc/FAL6-QG2V]. For a full understanding of the failures of for-profit colleges, 
see id. and COTTOM, supra note 2. 
 119. Judith Scott-Clayton, The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis Is Worse than We 
Thought, BROOKINGS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-stu 
dent-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/ [https://perma.cc/T8KQ-5J8N]. 
 120. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2012); see LeMay & Cloud, supra note 95, at 87. 
 121. For a full explanation of the administrative collection procedures for student debt, 
see Austin, supra note 86, at 406–07; Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of 
Student Loans: A Critical Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 215, 243–53 
(2014). 
 122. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., When Unpaid Student Loan Bills Mean You Can 
No Longer Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business 
/student-loans-licenses.html [https://perma.cc/DE5N-FEBT]. 
 123. Collections, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/default/c 
ollections#other-costs [https://perma.cc/7SRJ-NQ4E] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).  
 124. See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.  
 125. I recognize that even the use of the term “consumer” in this context might be 
considered an endorsement of the commodification of higher education. See supra notes 27–
28 and accompanying text. Perhaps a better term would be “student” or even “citizen.” See, 
e.g., D. Carolina Núñez, Mapping Citizenship: Status, Membership, and the Path in 
Between, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 477, 481 (recognizing that legal scholars have put a lot of stock 
in the concept of citizenship as a means of conceptualizing rights, participation, work, 
standing, and identity). I use consumer in this context, however, because: (1) it is the 
primary language used by higher education financing scholars; and (2) I believe that the 
consumer protection framework doctrine offers a framework that might stem the tide of 
exploitative financing practices. 
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III. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE EFFECT 
Not only does the investment imperative bubble up in higher 
education policy, it also drives and distorts individual decision-
making about postsecondary education. One industry study 
reported that nearly 100 percent of respondents, over ten years, 
noted that the primary driving force for college attendance is the 
notion that “[c]ollege is an investment in the student’s future.”126 
It also found that “[c]lose to [nine] in [ten] families said they knew 
the student would attend college as early as his or her enrollment 
in preschool.”127 It reported, however, that only about four in ten 
families had a plan to pay for college, with fewer families confident 
about that plan over time.128 Individual stories from original 
qualitative research provide an additional layer of support and 
insight as to those findings. The great majority of the sixty-five 
borrowers interviewed explicitly discussed either: (1) a sense that 
college was the natural or assumed next step, without articulating 
individual rationales for college attendance; (2) a belief that 
college was an economic investment in their future; or (3) both.129 
That commitment to higher education, however, was not 
necessarily connected to a plan for financing the college 
investment. Rather, the majority of respondents borrowed 
indiscriminately against their future, putting faith in the promise 
of the investment imperative. This Part explores how the 
investment imperative affects students’ decision-making about 
attending and financing their postsecondary education. 
A. Methodology 
“Qualitative research ‘is a broad umbrella term for research 
methodologies that describe and explain persons’ experiences, 
behavi[or]s, interactions and social contexts’ without relying on 
quantitative or statistical models.”130 By engaging intimately with 
individuals directly affected by laws, policies, and systems, 
qualitative work adds context and nuance to quantitative 
research.131 It fills in gaps in previous research and opens up new 
                                                     
 126. See SALLIE MAE, supra note 12, at 5. 
 127. Id. at 6. 
 128. Id. at 28. 
 129. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 130. Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
435, 458 (2013) (quoting Ellie Fossey et al., Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative 
Research, 36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (2002)).  
 131. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 242 (2017) 
(“[W]hat we can glean only by engaging in in-depth interviews with those directly affected 
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questions for future research.132 Because the goal of qualitative 
work is to garner in-depth information from a smaller group of 
people, it “makes no claim of the generalizability of findings to a 
specified larger population in a probabilistic sense.”133 
Accordingly, qualitative analysis in this Article does not generally 
quantify data, but uses terms such as “most,” “many,” and similar 
adjectives.134 Legal scholars frequently rely on qualitative data to 
investigate the effects of the legal system on individual people.135 
This Article utilizes the data from an original qualitative 
research study in which I am a co-investigator.136 Over the course 
of ten months (from August 2017 to May 2018), two researchers at 
the UNC Center for Community Capital interviewed individuals 
who used loans to finance some or all of their higher education.137 
I set out the basic outlines of the sample below. For a more detailed 
                                                     
by the legal rules, systems, and processes we study: an understanding of how, in their 
actual social contexts, these actors experience, understand, and internalize the relevant 
legal rules and structures, and how these structures become sources of personal meaning 
and determinants of behavior.”). 
 132. Id. at 242, 265–66 (“The aim of the study and sampling strategy is to illuminate 
and understand rather than to predict or determine causation. This is the dominant 
strategy used among analytical sociologists.”). 
 133. Sousa, supra note 130, at 458 (quoting Fossey et al., supra note 130, at 730).  
 134. This is consistent with accepted qualitative analysis methods. See Greene, supra 
note 131, at 266. 
 135. See, e.g., Foohey, supra note 23, at 1345 (using a qualitative study of religious 
organizations that filed chapter 11 bankruptcy to understand whether and how the leaders 
conceptualized their financial problems as legal problems solvable through legal 
reorganization); Greene, supra note 131, at 242, 267–68 (using qualitative data to provide 
insight into the experiences of recipients of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned 
Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013) (using 
a qualitative study to test the benefits and drawbacks of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) as a poverty-reduction program); Sousa, supra note 130, at 461 (using qualitative 
data to better understand the relationship between bankruptcy, shame, and stigma); see 
also Greene, supra, at 521 n.32 (cataloguing “important studies in legal scholarship [that] 
have been conducted using qualitative methods”).  
 136. I was not involved in the sampling or interviewing, but was involved in modifying 
the interview guide, topic monitoring, and analysis. 
 137. “The [UNC] Center for Community Capital is a non-partisan, multi-disciplinary 
research center housed within the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a 
leading center for research and policy analysis on the power of financial capital to transform 
households and communities in the United States.” Our Organization, CTR. FOR 
COMMUNITY CAP., https://communitycapital.unc.edu/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/Q2KJ-XYZ 
F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). The interviews were undertaken with the approval and 
guidance of the University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board. All 65 interviews 
were conducted by Jess Dorrance and/or Julia Barnard, two researchers who were then 
employed by the UNC Center for Community Capital. For a complete explanation of the 
methods employed, see DAVID ANSONG ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, RESEARCH ON 
THE IMPACT OF STUDENT LOAN DEBT ON HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL HEALTH: 
METHODOLOGICAL & TECHNICAL APPENDIX 4–5 (2019).  
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breakdown of the sample and a comparison of the sample 
characteristics to the nationally-representative sample of 
undergraduates and graduates contained in the National Post-
Secondary Aid Study, please see the Methodological and Technical 
Appendix for the underlying study.138 The researchers employed a 
semi-structured interview approach, using an interview guide on 
a range of issues, asking about each respondent’s experience 
deciding whether and where to attend college and how to finance 
that decision, the respondent’s financial and social experiences in 
college, and the respondent’s financial and social experiences after 
college. The researchers surveyed and interviewed 65 people 
ranging in age from 19 to 58, with an average age of approximately 
31. They spoke with 32 men and 33 women currently living in 
Austin, Texas; Bryan/College Station, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; 
Durham/Raleigh, North Carolina; Houston, Texas; Kansas City, 
Kansas; Lawrence, Kansas; Los Angeles, California; New York 
City, New York; and San Antonio, Texas.139 Interviews ranged 
from approximately thirty to seventy-five minutes. Each 
respondent received a $35.00 Target gift card.140 To recruit 
respondents, the researchers “used a combination of three 
nonprobability sampling strategies[—]convenience, maximum 
variation, and snowball sampling,” supplemented by consecutive 
sampling in some locations.141 With the participants’ consent, the 
researchers audio-recorded and transcribed the interviews. The 
researchers also interviewed a number of “key informant” experts; 
those interviews provided context for the analysis. 
After consulting with the researchers to generate a list of 
relevant topics and discuss research questions, I reviewed the 
transcripts for discussion related to the identified topics, using a 
structural coding technique142 via a qualitative data analysis 
software program called Atlas.ti. Such topic monitoring allowed 
me to examine general themes and patterns across the 
transcripts.143 
                                                     
 138. See ANSONG ET AL., supra note 137, at 11. 
 139. The sample is not a representative sample, as compared to the general population 
or to the primary federal higher education data collection, the National Post-Secondary Aid 
Study (NPSAS). As relative to NPSAS, the sample used herein is overrepresented by 
borrowers of color, men, borrowers who have sought higher education beyond an associate’s 
degree, and first generation students. See id. at 6–7, 11. 
 140. This compensation is consistent with standard social-science research protocols. 
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 131, at 265. 
 141. See ANSONG ET AL., supra note 137, at 4. 
 142. JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS 98–99 
(3d ed. 2016). 
 143. Id.; see also Greene, supra note 131, at 266 (describing a similar process); Sousa, 
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While I consulted with the researchers throughout the 
interviews and to develop the interview guide, the interview guide 
was not designed to test any of the theories this Article advances. 
Rather, the insights that arose out of the interviews, when viewed 
alongside other data and scholarship, provided support for the 
investment imperative theory developed herein.144 Consistent 
with basic tenets of social science research, pseudonyms have been 
used to protect the confidentiality of the respondents.145 
By paying attention to individual student borrower’s 
experiences, we can understand how higher education laws and 
policies interact with social context and real lives. While the 
theories advanced in this Article do not rely on the sample alone, 
the data from the sample provide information and insight to 
complement, corroborate, and complicate the theories. Because 
our sample is small and (purposely) diverse, it is hard to draw 
conclusions specific to certain subsections of the population. Much 
more work should be done in this area to better understand how 
certain population groups experience higher education and 
student debt in different ways. What is interesting and valuable 
about this study is that certain themes arose across the varied 
sample. Those themes, when placed in the context of other 
qualitative and quantitative studies and scholarly works, suggest 
that (1) the investment imperative is a widely-held construct; (2) 
the investment imperative drives college attendance; and (3) the 
investment imperative distorts students’ decision-making about 
higher education in interesting, and problematic, ways. The 
remainder of the Article delves into more detail on these themes.  
B. The Investment Imperative Buy-In 
For the great majority of the students interviewed, college 
matriculation was assumed. The desire to go to college was 
ingrained in them and they were unable to articulate when or why 
they chose to pursue a college education. This theme arose across 
family income, cultural background, and parental educational 
attainment. Respondents noted that college was “non-
                                                     
supra note 130, at 463 (describing a similar process). 
 144. But see Foohey, supra note 23, at 1334, 1340 (using qualitative interviews to test 
a hypothesis that arose from quantitative findings). 
 145. See Sousa, supra note 130, at 463. 
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negotiable,”146 “assumed,”147 “presumed,”148 “an expectation,”149 
and “just generally what you did.”150 Several respondents 
explicitly recognized that college attendance was never a choice.151 
In other words, little individual thought centered on whether to 
pursue higher education. This is the imperative part of the 
investment imperative. When something is unavoidable or 
required, it is imperative. It is done without additional 
consideration because it is necessary. 
Upon further investigation, many respondents connected 
their assumptions about college attendance to messaging they got 
from their families, high schools, or communities.152 The source of 
this messaging did differ somewhat across groups. For some, prep 
or high schools led them to higher education: “I think it was 
always, like in high school I was always in college prep courses or 
honors courses, so it was never a question about whether or not I 
would go to college.”153 For many, family and friends 
communicated that college was the only option. Respondents 
whose parents and grandparents sought higher education made 
such pronouncements: “I was raised in an environment where 
college was always the expectation, and higher ed was always the 
goal. My parents said that to me quite often, and that was just part 
of my mom’s mantras for her kids.”154 Claudio recalled, “My 
grandmother went to college[,] so I was going to college. I mean, I 
                                                     
 146. Interview with Illinois Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018). 
 147. Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); see also Interview with 
Texas Borrower Four (Feb. 17, 2018). 
 148. Interview with Illinois Borrower Nine (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 149. Interview with Kansas Borrower Two (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 150. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 151. See, e.g., Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018) (“Not going to 
[college] was just not something I ever thought of.”); Interview with California Borrower 
Six (Apr. 14, 2018) (going to college “just was never a second thought”); Interview with 
Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018) (the decision to attend college “wasn’t really a choice”); 
Interview with Texas Borrower Nine (Feb. 18, 2019) (“My parents never really made it an 
option . . . .”). 
 152. See COTTOM, supra note 2, at 128 (referencing sociologist Anne Mullen’s work 
with Ivy League students, who could not describe how or why they decided to attend college 
and could not separate their own college aspirations from their parent’s expectations). 
 153. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 154. Interview with Texas Borrower Five (Feb. 17, 2018); see also Interview with 
California Borrower Nine (Apr. 15, 2018) (“[I]n the community that I grew up in, it was 
kind of expected. It was really rare for people not to go to college. So it’s just kind of like an 
expectation.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I grew up in 
northern Virginia, which is pretty well-off suburbs. A lot of successful people, work for the 
government, other businesses. So, it was already around that, people went to college. And 
that’s just generally what you did.”). 
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guess I never thought about not going to college.”155 First-
generation college students received similar messaging from their 
parents. Savi explained: 
There wasn’t even, like, a question as to whether we were 
gonna go. Like, we had to. You know, I never even know [sic] 
there were other options other than going to a four-year 
school. So, I mean, even though neither one of my parents 
graduated from college they really stressed that we had to go 
to college.156  
Cheryl recalled, “I don’t think college was ever . . . [t]here was ever 
a question that I wouldn’t go. I mean my parents never went so 
they definitely pushed it where it was never not an option.”157 And 
Robert recalled, “I’m the first[-]generation college student in my 
family, so my dad always came up to me and was like, ‘Oh, you’re 
going to go to college, right?’ I didn’t even know what that was.”158 
And for students with immigrant parents, the investment 
messaging around higher education was particularly strong.159 
The imperative is justified by the sense of economic 
investment. Sociologist Sara Goldrick-Rab, after significant 
quantitative and qualitative work in higher education, has 
concluded: “Higher education is no longer seen as a choice or a 
luxury—it is viewed as the only available next step and, indeed, 
the only hope.”160 Our respondents agreed. Upon reflection about 
their college decisions, many respondents connected their college 
goals to an expected financial result.161 Respondents discussed 
                                                     
 155. Interview with California Borrower One (Apr. 13, 2018). 
 156. Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017). Scholars agree that, 
especially for low-income students, “getting ahead in life is a main reason for attending 
college.” GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 166. 
 157. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 158. Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 159. See, e.g., Interview with New York Borrower Five (Oct. 16, 2017) (“[I]t was a 
theme that my parents had. They’re from the Dominican Republic, so they just felt like 
school, college, was the way to be a qualified candidate to do jobs that they deemed just 
admirable: teacher, nurse, doctor, whatever the case may be.”); see also Interview with New 
York Borrower Four (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Three (Sept. 
3, 2017). 
 160. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 19. 
 161. See, e.g., Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017) (“I think that I 
would tell somebody coming out of high school that the debt that you accrue in 
undergraduate degree is gonna be insignificant in comparison to the . . . value that you get 
from having a degree.”). Of course, financial investment was not the only reason why our 
respondents wanted to attend college. See, e.g., Interview with California Borrower Eight 
(Apr. 15, 2018) (“I knew that the only way out was college.”); Interview with Illinois 
Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I started kind of thinking about the possibility of just using 
college as a way to get out of . . . a very small town in North Carolina.”); Interview with 
Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017) (discussing his “crazy, crazy family” and that “college 
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college as a means of making money,162 gaining skills that would 
lead to career advancement,163 or as a “business investment.”164 
Darryl explained: “I didn’t want to be in a warehouse anymore. I 
didn’t want to lay carpet anymore. I didn’t want to wash dishes 
anymore, and I didn’t want to scrub floors anymore.”165 Susie 
disclosed, “I feel like just the way this society is built, you go to 
college you make more money. The data shows it.”166 And Jesse 
reflected on the messaging he had received since elementary 
school that pointed to college as “the golden land” and “the only 
means to success.”167 Cheryl explained her version of the 
investment imperative: 
I mean it’s kind of a typical, I think, Asian family story. Or 
an immigrant family story. They just wanted me to have 
something they didn’t[,] and in their eyes[,] education was 
the only way to become successful. So like going to get my 
undergrad and then going directly to grad school or some 
type of higher education is the only way that I could make 
money . . . . Because they’re kind of stuck in one economic 
status and their income is kind of, it’s not fluid. It’s very 
static so the only way to kind of get above that bracket is to 
go to school.168 
While not everyone shared the same story, the investment 
imperative acted as connective tissue throughout the data. 
                                                     
was going to be the next step away from that . . . .”); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four 
(Aug. 31, 2017) (“I wanted to be away from my family. I wanted to have my own place.”). 
And many discussed the importance of developing skills and opening their world views. See, 
e.g., Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017) (“I think education, in a way, 
just helps you to branch out and open new doors and give you ideas and open your own 
resources to the things that you could use and need.”). Several also noted that a bachelor’s 
degree would not provide a sufficient return on investment, requiring further higher 
education. See Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with 
New York Borrower Eight (Oct. 17, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Ten (Feb. 19, 
2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018). 
 162. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I mean, I just saw it 
as a step so I can have a full-time career so I can make the money to pay it back . . . .”). 
 163. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Five (Jan. 18, 2018). 
 164. Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 165. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 166. Interview with New York Borrower Four (Oct.16, 2017). 
 167. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Three (Sept. 3, 2017). 
 168. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); see also Interview with 
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017) (“My dad just said that if I go to college it’s a way to 
improve your life, to do better . . . .”); Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 
2017) (“They thought that if I went to college, I would be able to get a job and work full-
time and get money.”). 
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Because students are conditioned to see higher education as 
an imperative investment in their own human capital,169 many fail 
to connect college attendance with college financing. It is college 
at any cost. Respondents noted that they “didn’t consider the 
tuition part,”170 didn’t “remember payment coming up” during the 
application process,171 and that affordability was an 
“afterthought.”172 While the language and attitude differed across 
respondents, several who qualified for a Pell Grant also noted a 
disconnect between attending college and paying for college. For 
example, Diana explained: 
I just never thought of the cost really, because I always just 
knew it was something that I was gonna do, so I never . . . I 
don’t know. I just always knew I was gonna take out loans to 
cover what scholarships I couldn’t get. So, I never even was 
thinking, even though I worked a lot in high school, I was 
never thinking, “Oh, I should be saving some money so that 
I can support myself when I go to school.” It was so off my 
radar.173 
LaToya expressed a similar sentiment: 
At some point it wasn’t even a question of whether I would 
go to college or not, I just knew I was going. As far as figuring 
out how to pay for college, there was no discussion within the 
home. We just kind of assumed that you were just going to 
go, it didn’t matter how you got there, you were going to go.174  
Like LaToya, many other low-income students made similar 
pronouncements.175 
                                                     
 169. See Kraiem, supra note 11, at 706–07 (arguing that “[t]he language of individual 
investment in human capital” is powerful and is the “primary way that we talk about higher 
education . . . .”). 
 170. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); see also Interview with 
Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (describing how she was not thinking about how 
to pay, but rather “just thinking about the quality of education I wanted to get”). 
 171. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 172. Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018). 
 173. Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017). 
 174. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017). 
 175. LaToya qualified for a Pell Grant, an indicator that she comes from a low-income 
family. Others also qualified for Pell Grants. See Interview with California Borrower Six 
(Apr. 14, 2018) (noting that her dad indicated that cost didn’t matter as long as she went to 
college); Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018) (recognizing that the 
messaging about the necessity of college depressed the need to understand or limit loans); 
Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (acknowledging that she was not 
thinking about how to pay for her higher education, instead focusing only on the desired 
quality of education); Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017) (recognizing 
that her conversations with her parents about attending college did not include discussions 
of how to pay for college); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017) (referring 
to conversations with his parents about college, stating: “[I]t was basically like, ‘It doesn’t 
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Because attendance—and not financing—was the primary 
motivator, many respondents borrowed indiscriminately to 
finance their education. Several signed loan documents without 
worrying about the costs that would accrue. Respondents 
explained, “I was like yes I’ll take it all because I didn’t know what 
I would need, and what would happen basically[,]”176 and “[i]t felt 
like plugging my nose and diving in.”177 William described feeling 
disconnected from the loan dollars, only to be hit with reality at a 
later date. He recalled: 
Even though I was taking out loans for . . . summer school 
and loans were coming out there and here, . . . I didn’t feel 
like it affected me directly, it was just numbers going up and 
down; my bank account, or the game I was playing with 
the . . . Financial Office[,] . . . [b]ut it never really felt real.178 
An even greater number of respondents noted that they did 
not understand the loans they were accepting. They failed to 
understand the amount accrued,179 interest rates,180 repayment 
plans and options,181 or the difference between a grant and a 
loan.182 Some admitted to signing loan documents they did not 
read or understand.183 Stephanie lamented, “I realized as a first-
                                                     
matter how much money it costs. . . . [I]f you have to get loans you just have to do it’”); 
Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017) (discussing finding herself at college 
without having considered the costs); Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017) 
(noting that there was no question that she was going to college, but that “how [she was] 
going to pay for it was very different. . . . that was just up in the air”); Interview with Texas 
Borrower Six (Feb. 17, 2018) (recognizing that cost wasn’t a big factor in her decision to 
attend an HBCU, although “it probably should have been”); Interview with Texas Borrower 
Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018) (cost was part of the conversation about choosing colleges, but “it 
wasn’t a major factor” and “wasn’t even in the top three . . . .”). 
 176. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018); see also Interview with New 
York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017) (“I think I just took honestly whatever was offered as 
part of the package. I definitely didn’t make any decisions at that time to say like well 
actually I need less or I’ll just make up the difference with my other side jobs. I just took 
whatever was on the paper, and I got the refund and I was happy with it.”). 
 177. Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017). 
 178. Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018). Borrowing 
indiscriminately does not necessarily mean borrowing enough. Contrary to the popular 
conception of overly indulged college students, for many students, even the full financial 
aid package offered is insufficient to support basic needs while in college. GOLDRICK-RAB, 
supra note 3, at 235–36 (“Relying on standard aid numbers, which frequently overestimate 
a family’s ability to pay and underestimate the true cost of attendance, provides a false 
sense of assurance that a full aid package (such as that offered by well-endowed private 
schools) truly takes money off the table for some students.”); see also infra note 257. 
 179. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 180. Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018). 
 181. Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 182. Interview with North Carolina Borrower One (Aug. 4, 2017). 
 183. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I remember signing 
stuff and not reading it.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I very 
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year student, I didn’t know the different types of loans. That was 
not explained to me at all, like subsidized, unsubsidized, private, 
federal. Who the hell is Sallie [Mae]? Why do I hate her so much 
now?”184 Our data are consistent with other data. One nationally-
representative study of first-year college students holding federal 
loans found a “surprisingly large fraction of . . . students were 
unaware of how much they borrowed when asked less than a year 
after they signed the promissory notes for their loans.”185 It further 
found that no more than 25 percent of students could accurately 
state their total borrowing within 10 percent, with half 
underestimating their debt and the other quarter overestimating 
their debt.186 The researchers found that more than one-quarter of 
the borrowers did not understand that they held federal loans and 
14 percent did not understand that they had any debt at all.187 
For several of the students interviewed, parents or other 
trusted adults took responsibility for the student’s financial aid 
application, even though the loans were in the student’s name.188 
Chelsea remarked, “Well, my dad told me about [a college] and I 
didn’t realize it, but next thing I knew is I was here and I didn’t 
really think about money or nothing.”189 Ebony recalled, “The 
finances were really my parents. . . . But I was oblivious to my 
finances for college until after when I found out I had [loans] in my 
name.”190 Tracey remembered that a family friend helped her mom 
understand how to finance college and apply for loans. Tracey 
recalled: 
I wouldn’t know what was going on because the things were 
in my name and she would give me my password and login 
information, I rarely used it, though I had access to it. I feel 
like she was very involved, my mom was very involved, I 
wasn’t very involved. Until it was time to start paying them 
                                                     
much remember applying for loans and I just felt like I was signing something that I didn’t 
really understand what that meant for me.”). 
 184. Interview with California Borrower Eight (Apr. 15, 2018). 
 185. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 112 (citing ELIZABETH J. AKERS & MATTHEW 
M. CHINGOS, ARE COLLEGE STUDENTS BORROWING BLINDLY? 9 tbl.1 (2014), https://www.br 
ookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Are-College-Students-Borrowing-Blindly_Dec-20 
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/32FJ-52V6]). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 113. 
 188. It is important to acknowledge that our sample skewed young. This would likely 
be different for the increasing number of students entering postsecondary education at a 
more advanced age. 
 189. Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017). 
 190. Interview with Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018); see also Interview with Texas 
Borrower Four (February 17, 2018) (recalling being unaware of a loan his father had taken 
out in his name until his junior year of college). 
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back, and then I found myself logging in more often to see 
what I needed to do.191  
Luke had a similar experience: 
I can’t remember, I honestly can’t remember, but I took the 
thing that my dad was like, ‘Take that.’ And then he’s like, 
‘I’ll help you pay for it.’ Which is kind of a funny thing 
because you take out a loan only in your name . . . . I’ve never 
had that conversation with him, it’s just that I have all this 
debt in my name now . . . .192 
Students who made college choices without considering the 
costs, borrowed indiscriminately, or failed to understand the costs 
they were accruing are not outliers.193 Rather, they are the 
norm.194 They have bought into the investment imperative and put 
their faith in higher education. Many have taken on significant 
debt. This paradigm is, of course, regulated and governed by the 
laws and policies discussed above—the laws and policies that were 
themselves influenced by the investment imperative. The 
confluence of the policy’s and borrower’s adoption of the 
investment imperative thus distorts students’ decision-making 
about attending and financing their college education. The next 
Part identifies and explores those effects and their consequences. 
IV. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE DISTORTS CONSUMER 
DECISION-MAKING 
It is possible to understand the investment imperative as a 
positive construct that leads to increased access to higher 
education and greater ultimate economic security for those who 
answer its call. In fact, there is great value in holding up a dream 
for which children and young adults can strive. This is especially 
true in today’s economy, where a college degree is often the key to 
the labor market.195 And even though there is discussion of a 
                                                     
 191. Interview with Texas Borrower Six (Feb. 17, 2018). 
 192. Interview with California Borrower Seven (Apr. 15 2018). 
 193. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 28 (“[T]here is strong evidence that most 
students do not have an accurate understanding of how much debt they have.”). 
 194. Id.  
 195. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 237–38 (“But college is now essential, and 
unfortunately there are no alternatives. . . . [I]f you cannot attend college, you’re lost. You 
are systemically locked out of nearly every decent-paying job opportunity, every safe 
neighborhood, and every opportunity to create safe futures for your children.”); LeMay & 
Cloud, supra note 95, at 79 (“For the 17,487,475 students enrolled in colleges and 
universities, access to postsecondary education is perhaps the one best hope for personal 
fulfillment, vocational success, social mobility, and economic security.”); Sima J. Gandhi, 
Understanding Students from a Behavioral Economics Perspective: How Accelerating 
Student Loan Subsidies Generates More Bang for the Buck, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 130, 
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“student debt crisis,”196 several scholars argue that, on average, 
borrowing for college is a wise investment.197 
What has generally been ignored, however, are the ways that 
the investment imperative drives and distorts consumers’ 
decisions about their higher education, especially with respect to 
financing. Building on the previous Part’s discussion of 
indiscriminate borrowing, this Part identifies and explores two 
effects of the investment imperative on students and their 
families. 
First, it argues that the investment imperative encourages an 
information ostrich effect, whereby student borrowers ignore and 
avoid information related to the costs and financing of their 
education and, thus, their education debt. This ostrich effect 
makes information campaigns ineffective and creates 
opportunities for bad actors to exploit the investment imperative 
to take advantage of vulnerable students. 
Second, this Part argues that the investment imperative 
creates the conditions for a student debt cascade for certain 
borrowers who find that their financial reality post-graduation 
does not match what the investment imperative seems to promise. 
For those graduates (or nongraduates), who feel that their student 
debt outweighs the value they received from their education, 
feelings of shame or disappointment can lead to avoidance and, 
ultimately, default on their education debt. Aggressive collection 
techniques reinforce distress emotions, cost the taxpayer money, 
and do nothing to advance society. 
                                                     
136 (2007–2008) (citing to a series of studies that establish the gap in economic security 
between college graduates and those without degrees). 
 196. See, e.g., ANNE JOHNSON ET AL., THE STUDENT DEBT CRISIS 15 (2012), https://  
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WhiteStudentDebt-5.pdf [https://  
perma.cc/7J3A-9YPS] (defining the current student debt situation as a “crisis”); Tom 
Lindsay, New Report: The U.S. Student Loan Debt Crisis Is Even Worse than We Thought, 
FORBES (May 24, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomlindsay/2018/05/24/new 
-report-the-u-s-student-loan-debt-crisis-is-even-worse-than-we-thought/#12809284e438 
[https://perma.cc/5HAX-KRAP] (defining the current student debt situation as a “crisis”). 
But see Baum, supra note 17, at 40–41 (arguing that aggregate debt numbers overestimate 
the level of “crisis” for the majority of student borrowers, for whom the decision to invest in 
higher education will have a sufficient financial return); Morgan Housel, Student Loan 
Bubble: Not as Bad as It Looks, MOTLEY FOOL, https://www.fool.com/investing/general 
/2012/06/01/student-loan-bubble-not-as-bad-as-it-looks.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ZVR-9G3A] 
(last updated Apr. 7, 2017); Tami Luhby, There Is No Student Loan “Crisis”, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 30, 2012, 4:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/30/news/economy/student-loans 
/index.htm [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-Q82Y]. 
 197. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 17, at 38. 
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A. The Ostrich Effect 
Borrowed from cognitive science and behavioral economics, 
the “ostrich effect” is the tendency for people to avoid negative 
information in favor of positive information.198 In an oft-cited 
paper exploring whether investors seek out information about 
their stock portfolios, economists Niklas Karlsson, George 
Loewenstein, and Duane Seppi found that investors exhibited an 
“ostrich effect” when it came to their own stock portfolios. Given 
bad or ambiguous market information, investors avoided 
collecting information on their stock portfolios; given positive 
market information, the investors sought out updates on their 
stock portfolios.199 
The investment imperative encourages a similar ostrich effect 
with respect to information about higher education quality and 
financing. It emphasizes the positive outcomes of higher education 
and ignores or discounts the costs. Even more obviously, the 
investment imperative implies that each individual person who 
attains higher education will see the socioeconomic bump that the 
aggregate data show, without accounting for individual deviation, 
clusters of vulnerable borrowers, or exploitation arising out of lax 
regulation. This “promise” encourages the ostrich effect in 
students, especially those reliant on credit-financed education. It 
becomes unnecessary to seek out information about instructional 
quality or loan financing terms because higher education is 
imperative, and loans are often the only means of accessing that 
education. The ostrich effect is evident both prior to college 
attendance and in repayment after graduation. 
1. Pre-College. Ideally, prospective college students will 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis prior to beginning college. Those 
students might best assess the likely value of their education prior 
to accepting a spot at a college or university. Students rarely 
undertake this assessment, however, in part because the task is 
nearly impossible. And in the face of that near impossibility, the 
ostrich effect—driven by the investment imperative—justifies the 
borrower’s choice to ignore information about her prospective 
education and related debt. 
To accurately assess the financial benefit of a particular 
college choice, a student would need to accurately predict the value 
of her major and degree from a particular institution in a specific 
                                                     
 198. See supra note 23. 
 199. Niklas Karlsson et al., The Ostrich Effect: Selective Attention to Information, 38 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104–06 (2009). 
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geographic region, approximately five years into the future.200 She 
would also need to accurately predict whether and how quickly she 
would attain that degree. To accurately assess the financial cost of 
a particular college choice, the student would need to understand 
and accurately predict her financial aid package, the tuition and 
costs of her college attendance, and account for any financial 
changes for a period of approximately five years.201 These are 
nearly impossible tasks. Colleges make promises, but do not 
deliver. Students change majors or fail to graduate. Students and 
their families suffer financial emergencies. Financial aid packages 
change over time. Tuition and fees change over time. Life is messy, 
complicated, and difficult to predict. 
No wonder prospective students ignore the cost of their 
education and focus instead on the investment in themselves. It is 
easier to rely on the investment imperative and the construct of 
education debt as “good debt.”202 In this way, the ostrich effect is 
connected to the related problem of hyperbolic discounting, a 
concept that explains why people generally choose a smaller 
benefit that they will realize sooner over a larger benefit that they 
will realize later.203 The temporal distance of education debt 
repayment exacerbates the ostrich effect; it is easy to put the 
concern off for another day. Darryl recognized that he did not think 
about his loans during school, “just . . . studying, getting by, and 
. . . deal[ing] with [loans] later.”204 Christopher agreed: 
I remember applying for the loans and I remember thinking 
to myself, I’m not understanding very well what these loans 
mean with the interest rate and all of that. I remember 
                                                     
 200. Assuming that the prospective student is making this decision in the fall of their 
senior year in high school and matriculating to a four-year college or university, from which 
she will graduate on time. 
 201. In fact, studies show that borrowers and their families have great anxiety about 
changes to the cost of education during the course of the student’s education. GOLDRICK-
RAB, supra note 3, at 159 (citing a 2014 national survey showing that nearly one-third of 
parents of low-income college students were seriously concerned about diminishing grant 
aid, increased tuition, and increased loan rates). 
 202. Unlike mortgage debt, which is also considered “good debt” or “investment debt,” 
see, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (2015) (recognizing that both education debt and mortgage debt 
are considered “good debt”), education debt is riskier because the debtor cannot mitigate 
losses, see Glater, supra note 4, at 1581 (“A student borrower cannot resell her education to 
reduce losses.”). 
 203. See Gandhi, supra note 195, at 140–41 (arguing that the behavioral economics 
concepts of myopia and hyperbolic discounting occur in education lending because they 
explain how people value proximity over magnitude). 
 204. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018). 
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thinking, “I’ll worry about that later. You know I don’t have 
to pay that for the next four years.”205 
Many borrowers are financially unprepared before they begin 
college.206 When asked whether he received any guidance about 
applying for education loans, Riley lamented, “I wish I hadn’t been 
so young and dumb.” When the researcher mentioned, “[t]he 
person before you literally said young and dumb also,” Riley 
replied, “[c]ause at the time, you’re just like, ‘Oh, I’m going to pay 
this back. I’ll get a job. No big deal,’ and you know, here we are.”207 
Joseph described the moment during his senior year in college, 
when he and other graduating seniors went to a student loan 
counseling meeting and, for the first time, he realized the amount 
of education debt he had amassed.208 He recalled getting an 
envelope and learning that he was expected to pay the loans 
beginning six months from graduation.209 Joseph described the 
collective shock: 
And we had been living in fantasy land or something, you 
know. And I got my envelope, and literally this is last 
semester of senior year, and [I] had never thought about 
what this is actually costing me, or what it was costing my 
parents. I just knew I was there, I was doing good . . . . But 
then at the end, and the winner is, and it was like . . . 
$16,000.210 
Darryl, Christopher, Riley, and Joseph shared common 
experiences.211 Entering the education loan market for the first 
time and inundated with messages of the investment imperative, 
it was easy for them to ignore the effects of debt or put off the 
effects until later. 212 And when financial aid packages are hard to 
                                                     
 205. Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017) (also recalling, “[t]o be 
honest, I think my mindset was I’ll worry about it later because I wasn’t taught completely 
to worry about those things now and how those things impact me later”). 
 206. See, e.g., Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Definitely not 
financially prepared.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I think 
money was a very abstract thing.”). 
 207. Interview with Texas Borrower Three (Feb. 17, 2018). 
 208. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. (noting that one could look around the room and witness other people’s similar 
reaction and shock). 
 211. See supra notes 204–10. 
 212. Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers: A 
Derivatives-Based Proposal to Protect Students and Control Debt-Fueled Inflation in the 
Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 98 (2010) (arguing that a 
student-borrower is a “one-time participant in the higher education market” and “the party 
least equipped to make an accurate value judgment regarding educational options and 
costs”).  
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understand,213 but easy to sign, it is easy to put one’s head in the 
sand and ignore the down-the-road effects of the debt. 
2. Post-College. Six months after college graduation or 
dropping below half-time student status, most borrowers must 
begin repaying their federal loans.214 Federal borrowers have 
many options, and various rights, during the repayment of their 
loans. For example, although a borrower is automatically enrolled 
in a standard ten-year fixed repayment plan, she can instead opt 
in to one of four income-driven repayment plans, which allow 
borrowers to pay 10 to 20 percent of their discretionary income 
toward their student loan over the course of twenty to twenty-five 
years, after which their remaining debt is forgiven.215 She can also 
seek loan deferment or loan forbearance under certain 
circumstances.216 
Data show, however, that borrowers are not taking advantage 
of their rights and options while in repayment.217 Our respondents 
offer a clue as to why that is. 
                                                     
 213. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I feel like it’s just . . . 
murky waters . . . I feel like I probably need to know a lot more, and figure out exactly what 
my debt is. . . . [T]he problem is that I don’t even know where to start asking the right 
questions . . . .”). 
 214. Understanding Repayment, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/re 
pay-loans/understand#when-begin [https://perma.cc/4XDD-EQJX] (last visited Sept. 12, 
2019).  
 215. The income-driven repayment plans include Income-Based Repayment Plan, Pay 
As You Earn Repayment Plan, Revised Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan, and Income-
Contingent Repayment Plan. Income-Driven Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://student 
aid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/F7NC-5UK8] 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019). For a full understanding of Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) 
plans and possibilities for IDR-based reform, see Brooks, supra note 24, at 849–56. 
 216. Only certain loans (direct subsidized loans and federal Perkins loans) are eligible 
for deferment, during which time interest does not continue to accrue. Deferment and 
Forbearance, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/deferment-forbe 
arance#what-are [https://perma.cc/W2W8-2629] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). For the 
majority of loans, a borrower can only seek forbearance, during which time payments are 
not due, but interest continues to accrue and is capitalized into the principal of the loan at 
the close of the forbearance period. Id. 
 217. For example, regulators alleged that loan servicers have steered borrowers into 
forbearance without explaining the financial consequences, even when the borrower may 
be eligible for an income-driven repayment plan at a low- or no-cost monthly payment. See 
CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every 
Stage of Repayment, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinan 
ce.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-failing 
-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/UNB4-Z2XR] (last visited Sept. 12, 
2019). But see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE DEPARTMENT’S 
COMMUNICATION REGARDING THE COSTS OF INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLANS AND LOAN 
FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS 3, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2018/a 
09q0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R6B-ZYJJ] (finding a six-fold increase in the number of 
borrowers taking advantage of IDR plans between 2011 and 2015). 
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First, they remain confused about their loans even after they 
leave college.218 Cheryl explained, “I didn’t even know where to pay 
it when I graduated. I had no idea. Then I kept getting letters from 
a program, or some company, but I didn’t recognize the company 
name so I thought it was a scam.”219 And Chrystal explained: 
So when I graduated, it was like, I had a hell of a time 
figuring out who owned all of my loans, and I had no idea 
how much I had in all. It wasn’t until I started getting the 
bills in that I was able to put together how much I owed, who 
owned what, where all the payments needed to go, [and] how 
much they were going to be.220 
Second, they do not believe that they are entitled to advocacy 
with respect to their student debt. Although education debt is 
governed by statute and regulation, borrowers generally do not see 
student debt problems as legal problems or problems for which 
they are entitled to advocacy. When asked whether they might 
seek legal assistance for a student debt issue, the majority of our 
respondents answered in the negative.221 Respondents told 
researchers that they would not seek legal assistance because “I 
wouldn’t know what I would be seeking it for,”222 “I didn’t think I 
had a case,”223 and “I don’t know if that’s even possible.”224 Josh, 
who was seeking forgiveness through the Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness Program, which is a program governed by law and 
regulation, engaged in the following exchange: 
INT: And if you hit some snag in getting [your loans] 
forgiven, would you consider seeking legal assistance? 
RES: Probably not. I’d probably again, just being like, “[y]ou 
should have been on top of this,” Right? Like I should have 
been checking on my payment plans, I should have been 
paying more attention. I felt like that would have been on 
me.225 
                                                     
 218. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 28 (“[T]here is strong evidence that most 
students do not have an accurate understanding of how much debt they have.”). 
 219. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 220. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 221. This is consistent with bankruptcy research. See Foohey, supra note 23, at 1322 
(finding that faith leaders were hesitant to turn to the bankruptcy system to deal with their 
institutions’ financial concerns, unwilling to see them as a “legal problem”). 
 222. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); see also Interview with 
Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I wouldn’t know what I would seek legal 
assistance for.”). 
 223. Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr. 14, 2018). 
 224. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Seven (Apr. 5, 2018). 
 225. Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018). 
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Similar studies establish that, in general, low- and moderate-
income people hesitate to turn to the legal system, even when they 
have a legal claim.226 
I suggest that both the confusion and the timidity is related 
to the investment imperative and the ostrich effect. In much the 
same way that the investment imperative distorts prospective 
students’ view of higher education as disconnected from cost, upon 
reflection, students justify their decisions through the lens of the 
investment imperative. It is possible that shame and fear underlie 
that reflection, an issue that is further explored in Section IV.B. 
3. The Ostrich Effect Leads to Exploitation. The ostrich 
effect is problematic because it discourages prospective students 
from assessing the potential benefits and actual costs of their 
education. It also discourages post-college debtors from taking full 
advantage of their rights and responsibilities under the law, 
making it more likely that they will have bad financial outcomes. 
Perhaps most importantly, bad actors can—and do—exploit the 
combination of the investment imperative and the ostrich effect. 
In the education debt context, exploitation arises primarily in 
two contexts: recruitment and repayment. In recruiting students, 
institutions can exploit the investment imperative and 
information gap to encourage students to attend ineffective 
institutions. The for-profit-college industry most clearly illustrates 
this dynamic. The for-profit-college industry has been plagued 
with allegations of fraud, corruption, and provision of ineffective 
educational services.227 Tressie McMillan Cottom defines the 
problem as “Lower Ed”: “Lower Ed is the subsector of high-risk 
[postsecondary] schools and colleges . . . . Lower Ed encompasses 
all credential expansion that leverages our faith in education 
without challenging its market imperatives and that preserves the 
status quo of race, class, and gender inequalities in education and 
work.”228 Exploiting the investment imperative, Lower Ed colleges 
recruit vulnerable students (and their federal loan dollars). Those 
institutions exploit the investment imperative and information 
asymmetry in recruitment, preying on vulnerable prospective 
                                                     
 226. Foohey, supra note 23, at 1325 (citing studies). Student borrowers might, for 
example, have a legal claim against the Department of Education for failing to follow its 
regulations, against a lender for unfair debt collection practices, or against a debt 
consolidation company for unfair or deceptive practices. Even in the absence of a litigable 
legal claim, lawyers regularly help clients understand their rights and navigate 
administrative processes. 
 227. See SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, supra note 118, at 
1–6. 
 228. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
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students. Such institutions, for example, train recruiters to 
identify and “‘poke the pain points’ of wavering prospective 
students to remind them of why they need a degree.”229 One for-
profit marketing executive explained how his college recruited 
women who had been traumatized: they hired female recruiters to 
play the “good-enough mother” to recruits, offering them 
absolution (in the form of college attendance) to move past the 
trauma.230 In other words, they explicitly and expressly exploited 
the prospective student’s traumatic history to convince her to 
enroll in the institution. Cottom likens for-profit recruiters to 
television evangelists posing as priests, “sell[ing] prayer cloths 
that promise to solve all of a believer’s problems.”231 The 
investment imperative and the ostrich effect thus create a loop of 
vulnerability. Recruiters best exploit the investment imperative 
when the recruit has less information; recruits buy into the 
investment imperative, which itself justifies a student’s lack of 
information. 
This vulnerability loop does not break when the student 
graduates or otherwise leaves full-time higher education. Scams 
and exploitation also flourish during repayment. Debt settlement 
and debt consolidation companies seek out vulnerable debtors and 
sell them services that promise to lower monthly payments or 
forgive education debt altogether.232 Some companies charge for 
services that can be accomplished by the borrower for free at the 
Department of Education’s StudentLoans.gov website or through 
the borrower’s loan servicer.233 When they charge an up-front fee 
                                                     
 229. Id. at 129; see also SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, supra 
note 118, at 3 (discussing the recruiting process for for-profit education companies as being 
a sales process). 
 230. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 107. 
 231. Id. at 6. 
 232. See, for example, the Federal Trade Commission’s “Operation Game of Loans,” a 
“coordinated federal-state law enforcement initiative targeting deceptive student loan debt 
relief scams.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, State Law Enforcement Partners 
Announce Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams (Oct. 13, 2007), htt 
ps://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-enforcement-partners-a 
nnounce-nationwide-crackdown [https://perma.cc/5XXT-PQ5S]. 
 233. For example, borrowers can consolidate their loans, change their repayment plan, 
or seek a deferment or forbearance at no cost by calling their servicer or applying through 
the Department of Education website. See Loan Consolidation, FED. STUDENT AID, https://  
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/consolidation [https://perma.cc/2QF8-Q8MK] (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2019) (“There is no application fee to consolidate your federal education loans into 
a Direct Consolidation Loan. You may be contacted by private companies that offer to help 
you apply for a Direct Consolidation Loan, for a fee. These companies have no affiliation 
with the U.S. Department of Education (ED) or ED’s consolidation loan servicers. There’s 
no need to pay anyone for assistance in getting a Direct Consolidation Loan. The application 
process is easy and free.”). 
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for those services, debt-settlement companies often violate state 
and federal law.234 Some companies charge for services that 
promise impossible outcomes, like loan forgiveness. Those charges 
and misstatements violate state and federal law.235 Together, 
these companies have taken almost $100 million in illegal upfront 
fees from American borrowers.236 Fraudulent debt settlement and 
consolidation scams are enticing because student borrowers are 
overwhelmed by their debt and lack proper information about 
their rights and responsibilities as a debtor. These scams similarly 
exploit the intersection of the investment imperative and the 
ostrich effect because they bank on debtors who are too 
overwhelmed, embarrassed, ashamed, or otherwise unable to seek 
out information about their rights and responsibilities in 
repayment.237 
4. Is More Information the Easy Answer? Some might argue 
that the information gap has an easy fix—provide students with 
more information or make information more accessible. In fact, 
several organizations, including the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and various nonprofits, have tried to 
fill the information gap.238 Proposed legislation to overhaul the 
Higher Education Act proposes a college dashboard website that 
would provide information to students on institution type, 
enrollment, student/faculty ratio, graduation rates, average net 
price, average student loan debt, and median earnings of 
graduates.239 Some also argue that the information is already 
                                                     
 234. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 232. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. For a further discussion of shame and distress emotions related to student debt, 
see infra Section IV.B and also Greene, supra note 131, at 275–76 (arguing that debt 
settlement and debt consolidation services are consistent with a “self-sufficiency narrative” 
and “a moral alternative to bankruptcy and government ‘handouts’”). 
 238. Student Loans, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfina 
nce.gov/consumer-tools/student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/2UGX-QWLZ] (last visited Sept. 
12, 2019); Project on Student Debt, INST. FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS, https://ticas.org/posd/ 
home [https://perma.cc/5M7S-2GDJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). In fact, the CFPB’s 
supervisory authority broadly permits it to document, oversee enforce, and regulate issues 
related to student loans. Laurie A. Lucas & Christopher L. Peterson, Developments in 
Federal Student-Lending Law: Harbingers of Change?, 72 BUS. LAW. 465, 466–68 (2017). 
Recently, however, moves at the CFPB suggest that information campaigns may be the 
Bureau’s primary goal with respect to student loans in the near future. See Zack Friedman, 
CFPB Makes Major Changes to Student Loans Office, FORBES (May 10, 2018, 8:17 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2018/05/10/student-loans-changes-consumer/# 
671b3ba91a4c [https://perma.cc/5EVP-FTW6] (noting that the CFPB recently decided to 
fold its student loan office into the financial education office). 
 239. See PROSPER Act, H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. § 121(d) (2017). 
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available, and it is the borrower’s responsibility to seek out and 
utilize the information.240 
While providing more information to borrowers is a valuable 
goal, it will only be useful if done correctly.241 Bridging the 
information gap will only affect behavior if prospective, current, 
and former students can receive, process, and understand the 
information. Further, more information will only be helpful if 
prospective students have better or varied choices. Because college 
matriculation and financing are driven by the investment 
imperative, providing additional information alone is unlikely to 
alter behavior—or the vulnerability that stems from the 
information asymmetry—significantly. This is not to say that 
information campaigns are not useful; rather, information 
campaigns are not, by themselves, sufficient. 
Our data suggest that information before matriculation is not 
sticky for new college students in large part because of the 
investment imperative.242 LaToya recalled: 
So, I always thought I was going to college. I think it was 
more of my parents pushing me towards that direction. At 
some point it wasn’t even a question of whether I would go to 
college or not, I just knew I was going. As far as figuring out 
how to pay for college, there was no discussion within the 
home. We just kind of assumed that you were just going to 
go, it didn’t matter how you got there, you were going to go.243  
Jeffrey explained: 
It was just always sort of assumed that I would probably get 
some form of scholarship and that we would take out student 
loans to take care of the rest, which I really wasn’t worried 
about at the time because I thought, “oh, I’m going to medical 
                                                     
 240. See Kraiem, supra note 11, at 713 (arguing that the current higher education 
financing scheme adopts a consumer law mentality of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware”). 
 241. See D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1135–36 
(2017) (recognizing the difficulty in providing low- and moderate-income pro se plaintiffs 
with useful self-help guides and proposing approaches, including plain-language, 
illustrations and cartoon graphics, to better connect with unrepresented civil parties). 
 242. Cf. Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable Cost of Variable Pricing of Student 
Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137, 2142–46 (2013) (critiquing the suggestion that 
implementing variable interest rate education loans based on expected return-on-
investment will change student behavior). More and creative thinking in financial literacy 
might be able to make inroads on this problem. 
 243. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017); see also Interview 
with California Borrower Six (Apr. 14, 2018) (“[M]y dad was always like, ‘We’ll do whatever 
it takes, it doesn’t matter where you want to go.’ You know, just kind of like as long as you 
went it doesn’t really matter.”). 
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school, I’m going to have a high paying career eventually, I’ll 
be able to take care of this.”244  
Thus, more information would not have changed these students’ 
behavior,245 either because the information did not seem 
relevant246 or because additional information would not have 
changed their limited choices.247 While additional information 
about rights and responsibilities in repayment may offer some 
debtors relief or the ability to avoid scams, the investment 
imperative runs strong and deep. For many debtors, the sadness 
and shame associated with their failed investment in self 
exacerbates the ostrich effect and increases long-term negative 
financial repercussions. The next Section takes up this idea 
further. 
B. The Student Debt Cascade 
The investment imperative messages that college is a key to 
socioeconomic advancement, with little limitation and 
disconnected from the cost to the individual student. For many 
graduates, the promise of the investment lives up to the reality.248 
But for many others the promise of the investment does not line 
up with the reality of their college experience or their post-college 
financial lives.249 Thus, the investment imperative risks 
                                                     
 244. Interview with Illinois Borrower Six (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 245. See, e.g., AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 111 (“It’s clear that a lack of 
information has severely compromised students’ ability to make smart college-going and 
borrowing decisions. Students haven’t been able to make cost-benefit calculations with non-
existent information on benefits and difficult-to-obtain information on costs. But as more 
information becomes available, will it be enough to solve the broader decision-making 
problem? The available evidence from education and other fields indicates that individuals 
too often do not understand, much less make use of, the information that is available to 
them. This means that simply providing more information to students is unlikely to change 
their behavior.”). 
 246. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I’m not really sure 
[I would have taken advantage of information about student loans]. I guess it would help 
with budgeting, but I think in terms of student debt, I wasn’t too worried about it because 
there’s a 0% interest until I’m not a student anymore. And so, I didn’t really think about it 
that much.”). 
 247. See Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017) (“So, if they could have 
given me the exit counseling when they gave me the loans instead of after they’d already 
disbursed all the loans to me, it might have changed my point of view a little bit. Probably 
not, but maybe. I still needed the money, you know, at the end of the day.”); see also 
COTTOM, supra note 2, at 170–73 (arguing that the credential-driven labor market, which 
offers declining investment in workers, drives Lower Ed and that pointing to information 
asymmetry as the problem ignores the fact that many students have no “rational 
educational choice” in this new economy). 
 248. See infra notes 291–94 and accompanying text. 
 249. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 104 (recognizing that some individuals’ 
investments in higher education pay off better than others, but that “good decision making 
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overpromising students certain financial outcomes from seeking a 
college certification or degree, encouraging overconfidence in the 
ability to repay education debt. It distorts both the input and the 
output. 
This distortion can lead to distress emotions250 and avoidance 
of both information about the debt and of the debt itself. Avoidance 
can then lead to nonpayment and, ultimately, default. At the end 
of the day, the debt remains, and neither the borrower nor the 
lender—the American taxpayer—is in any better situation.251 This 
path—disconnect, distress emotions, avoidance, and default—is 
the “student debt cascade,”252 and it is connected to the investment 
imperative. 
1. In School. The investment imperative maintains that 
access to higher education is all that is necessary for a student to 
be able to achieve success on her own merits. The concept is this: 
once a student has access to enough loans—public, private,or 
both—to attend a college or university, she is then on the same 
level playing field as her peers and thus has the same opportunity 
for success.253 If she fails, it is because of her own shortcomings. 
But access to and enrollment in higher education do not even 
the playing field for students from different backgrounds. Our 
                                                     
is made nearly impossible by the lack of information available to potential college 
students”); GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 185 (“Students can enter college with great 
expectations that are sometimes unrealistic. Ideally, colleges would help students realize 
their ambitions, while also helping them understand reality—including the specific 
requirements needed for graduation and the [post-college] implications of their choices. 
That does not always happen.”). 
 250. See Austin, supra note 86, at 401–02 (citing studies that show that high debt 
burdens can be associated with migraines, headaches, stomachaches, back pains, increased 
risk of cardiovascular disease, hypertension, depression, higher mortality, including from 
suicide, delayed medical and dental care, low self-esteem, social isolation, chronic tension, 
and family problems, including higher rates of divorce). 
 251. The reason that the American taxpayer is harmed is because 90 percent of 
student loans are currently made by the United States, through the Department of 
Education. Brooks, supra note 24, at 851. The Department then contracts with servicers 
and debt collectors to service and collect on those loans. Loan Servicing Contracts, FED. 
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/business-info/contracts/loan-
servicing [https://perma.cc/3LE3-L29A] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 252. This Article introduces the “student debt cascade” theory as it emerged out of the 
qualitative data. It ties the theory to the literature on student debt and financial insecurity 
and uses the qualitative data to provide insight. It does not, however, fully flesh out the 
theory or argue causality. Rather, it is an initial theory that should be expanded and tested 
with additional scholarly and empirical work. 
 253. In this way, the investment imperative is deeply connected to the meritocracy 
myth, a concept that has been heavily and thoroughly critiqued. See Anne Lawton, The 
Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 
591 (2000) (critiquing the meritocracy myth as it has been applied in employment law); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 586 (1996) (discussing 
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data made clear that, for many students, they must balance their 
educational aspirations against work and family requirements. 
Contrary to popular belief, for many students, taking on the 
maximum amount of subsidized and unsubsidized loans is not 
sufficient to make financial ends meet while in college.254 Cheryl, 
for example, explained how she worked multiple jobs while she 
was in college: 
To give you a sense of my schedule, I would maybe wake up 
at four in the morning every day to go to my catering job in 
the morning. And then right after I might have a class at like 
ten or something and then I went to my afternoon job from, 
maybe, eleven to two or three or maybe four. And then maybe 
another class, like an evening class. And then I’d go straight 
to my job at the restaurant until they closed maybe at like 
ten. Cleaning up maybe at like eleven. Then I’d go to the 
library after maybe until like one. And then I’d come home. 
So it was just exhausting.255 
Cheryl maintained that schedule for two years, averaging 
approximately three hours of sleep per night.256 
Laura told a similar story. She worked three jobs for three 
years as an undergraduate, working in a research lab and as a tour 
guide during the day and at SafeWalk from 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. 
When she lived off-campus in her junior and senior year, Laura 
explained,  
I slept in the library, so from about 3:30 until 7:30, about 
three nights a week ’cause I didn’t have a car, and I didn’t 
want to pay for a car, and the buses don’t run. Nothing runs 
                                                     
the meritocracy myth as it relates to women in the legal profession and arguing that the 
myth relies on the assumptions that female lawyers are close to achieving proportionate 
representation in the legal field and that any “lingering disparities” are the result of the 
women’s “‘different’ choices and capabilities”); Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking 
the Invisible Knapsack, PEACE & FREEDOM MAG., July/Aug. 1989 (identifying the privileges 
attendant to whiteness and recognizing that “this is not such a free country; one’s life is not 
what one makes it; many doors open for certain people through no virtues of their own”). 
 254. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 9 (“Financial aid often falls short—in terms of 
both how much it pays for and how it is delivered.”). At first glance, this Section may appear 
to be in tension with the “ostrich effect” argument. Yet, financial aid is insufficient, poorly 
understood, bureaucratically complex, and based on a broken reliance on Estimated Family 
Contribution (EFC); See also Brooks, supra note 24, at 858 (“The available [Federal Direct 
Loan] debt is not sufficient to pay the average out of pocket costs of higher education.”). So, 
both things can coexist. Students can be uninformed about their loans or even borrow 
blindly for college and simultaneously be in a financially precarious situation while in 
college. 
 255. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 256. Id. 
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at that time. . . . Or I would go to the gym and go swimming 
for a little bit, and then I would shower.257 
In her book, Paying the Price, Sara Goldrick-Rab introduces 
readers to Alicia, an African American single mother from 
Milwaukee who dreamt of being a teacher or social worker.258 
Alicia described her schedule during her first semester: she spent 
seven and a half hours in class and four hours caring for her child. 
On top of that, Alicia worked thirty hours a week and took out a 
subsidized loan to pay for her college.259 
Students also discussed family responsibilities; some had to 
take care of family or had siblings come to live with them.260 Felix 
explained: 
My mother has schizoaffective disorder. She’s been a 
struggle all of my life. She lived with my grandmother . . . . 
She didn’t have the patience to deal with my mother[’]s crazy 
in the way that was most useful, so I was back in [my 
hometown] frequently with doctors appointments, with 
filling out forms. I spent a lot of my college experience crying 
on a phone with my mother getting her through her moments 
of crazy. That was very present. That was very, very, very 
present.261 
Sarah also recalled providing a lot of emotional caretaking for her 
sisters while she was in college, providing support for her family 
after her mother died and while her father grieved.262 And 
William’s sister lived with him his junior and senior year of 
college, requiring emotional and financial support.263 
Other respondents remembered having difficulty getting 
enough to eat while in college.264 Cheryl noted that she chose a 
                                                     
 257. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr. 4, 2018). Laura continued, “I 
would make an excellent homeless person.” Id. 
 258. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 195. 
 259. Id. at 196. 
 260. See also id. at 44 (citing Peter Kinsley’s study showing that 13 percent of the 
students surveyed regularly provided financial support to family while in college).  
 261. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 262. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 263. Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 264. This is consistent with other studies. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 128 
(showing that 24 percent of students surveyed indicated that in the past month they did 
not have enough money to buy food, ate less then they felt they should, or cut the size of 
their meals because there was not enough money); KIM DANCY & BEN BARRETT, LIVING ON 
CREDIT? AN OVERVIEW OF STUDENT BORROWING FOR NON-TUITION EXPENSES 10 (2018) 
(citing a study showing that 11 percent of students at four-year colleges and 14 percent of 
students at two-year colleges were food insecure); SARA GOLDRICK-RAB ET AL., COLLEGE 
AND UNIVERSITY BASIC NEEDS INSECURITY: A NATIONAL #REALCOLLEGE SURVEY REPORT 2, 
https://hope4college.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HOPE_realcollege_National_report_ 
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restaurant job “mostly so I could get extra food so I didn’t have to 
pay for food.”265 Others mentioned seeking emergency food aid266 
or remembered “not quite knowing how I was going to eat.”267 
Sarah explained: 
Having enough food to eat was always a huge thing, but I 
always found a way to make it work. Like, I would go to 
campus events where there would be pizza, or something. Or, 
I had friends that had extra dining dollars, and so I would 
make sure to set up times to hang out with them and they 
didn’t mind. So, it was always a nervousness, especially 
when, of course, it came down to the beginning or the end of 
the month, but I always found ways to make it work.268 
While Laura said that her grades did not suffer from her 
packed schedule, her quality of life suffered.269 And she was a 
lucky one. For many others, working multiple jobs, dealing with 
family obligations, or worrying about their next meal negatively 
affected their ability to succeed in college.270 Sean lamented his 
mediocre GPA, remembering, “[y]ou’re running from class to work, 
or you’re running from work to class, or you’re just tired from all 
the things that you’re doing.”271 Several respondents stated that 
they worked forty or more hours per week, on top of their school 
schedule, making it difficult to take full advantage of the 
educational, social, and professional experiences available to 
college students. Students who work multiple jobs while enrolled 
in college lack time to network, attend professor office hours, 
study, and sleep. Cheryl told researchers that having multiple jobs 
                                                     
digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AL7-SCLS] (of the 86,000 student survey respondents, 45 
percent reported food insecurity, 56 percent reported housing insecurity, and 17 percent 
reported homelessness in the prior year). For a thorough and complete understanding of 
food insecurity for college students, see GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, and Sara Goldrick-
Rab’s continued work. 
 265. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 266. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with 
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Eight (Feb. 18, 2018); 
Interview with Texas Borrower Fourteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 267. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018); see also Interview with New 
York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017) (“There were times when I did worry about food or like 
at the end of a semester like when your meal plan starts to run out . . . . There was some 
pressure around those times so I was like what [am] I going to eat, what can I afford to 
eat.”).  
 268. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 269. Id. 
 270. See, e.g, Interview with North Carolina Borrower Eight (Apr. 20, 2018); Interview 
with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr. 4, 2018). Studies also show that financially 
insecure students regularly neglected to purchase a course textbook, negatively affecting 
their ability to learn and succeed in college. See DANCY & BARRETT, supra note 264, at 10. 
 271. Interview with Illinois Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018). 
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while in college negatively affected her mental health and her 
grades.272 It also limited her ability to make connections with 
professors, making it more difficult to ask for letters of 
recommendation for law school.273 Cheryl had access to higher 
education. The investment imperative would have us believe that 
success was hers to win or lose. But Cheryl’s transcript, and her 
professors’ recommendations, are unlikely to evidence her hard 
work, undertaken against high odds. Alicia, from Paying the Price, 
after facing personal crises and decreasing family support, took on 
more childcare responsibilities, sought more hours at work, got 
less sleep, and spent less time on schoolwork.274 By the end of her 
sophomore year, Alicia had dropped out of school and stopped 
responding to the researchers.275 
It is impossible to ignore structural and institutional barriers 
in discussing why certain individuals or groups more successfully 
advance or maintain their socioeconomic standing. Yet the 
investment imperative does not account for those barriers. And 
when those barriers combine with the effects of student debt, they 
are aggravated, especially for borrowers, like Alicia, who drop out 
of college, borrowers like Cheryl, who were unable to compete on 
an equal level, and other vulnerable borrowers. The next Section 
pursues that further. 
2. After School. For many, including some of our 
respondents, the promise of the investment imperative did not pan 
out in their financial lives post-college. Many questioned whether 
the financial investment in their higher education provided a 
sufficient financial return and several explicitly stated that it did 
not. Even after recognizing that college changed his life for the 
better, Felix admitted, “[i]t was more expensive than it should’ve 
been. It was an incredibly valuable product and maybe not as 
valuable as I paid, maybe not as valuable as the price.”276 Cheryl 
would counsel prospective students to “[g]o to the place that you 
can afford. It does have to have a good name, but don’t worry 
yourself too much about getting into the biggest name because I 
think you might be wasting your money, especially if you’re taking 
                                                     
 272. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); see also GOLDRICK-RAB, 
supra note 3, at 99–101 (arguing that financial insecurity can have a profound effect on 
students’ mental health, physical health, and graduation rates). 
 273. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 274. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 197. 
 275. Id. at 198. 
 276. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017). 
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loans.”277 Others had similar reactions, noting that “schooling was 
very rewarding, [but] when I think of the finances it’s more of 
confusion and regret too,”278 calling the promise of higher income 
after college a “misconception,”279 and noting that “[c]ollege is not 
worth it.”280 
For several respondents, that disconnect was specifically 
connected to their student debt. In other words, it was the burden 
of education debt that limited their sense of post-graduation 
financial stability.281 Matt commented, with respect to one of his 
three degrees, “it was basically a waste of time, a waste of 
money.”282 Georgia noted: 
Honestly, a bachelor’s degree really doesn’t do that much 
anymore. When I was looking for jobs, that was really 
disheartening to me, because I was making these payments 
and I wasn’t having any income. I was like, “I have this 
degree, and I can’t even get a job to pay for my tuition that 
got me this degree.” So I felt like it was kind of a waste.283 
Although our study did not include students who dropped out 
of school, the connection is worth considering carefully. Studies 
show that there is a correlation between financial insecurity in 
college, student debt, lower grades, and higher drop-out rates.284 
This is particularly true for students of color.285 Some studies 
specifically correlate working more than twenty hours a week 
during college with dropping out.286 When students drop out of 
college, however, their debt does not disappear. Federal data 
showed that nearly four million undergraduates dropped out of 
                                                     
 277. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017). 
 278. Interview with Kansas Borrower Seven (Aug. 31, 2017). But see infra note 296 
and accompanying text. Although the intrinsic benefits of higher education are outside the 
scope of this project, it is important to recognize that many of our respondents recognized 
benefits to their higher education experience that stood apart from their frustration with 
the failed economic investment. The author plans to explore this further in future 
scholarship. 
 279. Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 280. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018). 
 281. See HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 2–3 (finding that graduates with student debt 
report a lower level of job satisfaction upon entering the workforce). 
 282. Interview with Illinois Borrower Four (Jan. 18, 2018). 
 283. Interview with California Borrower Nine (Apr. 15, 2018). This Article focuses 
primarily on the investment imperative for college, but it will be interesting to follow 
whether the same imperative emerges for graduate and professional school. 
 284. Brooks, supra note 24, at 859; Glater, supra note 4, at 1591. 
 285. Scholars have found a disproportionate relationship between financial insecurity 
and drop-out rates for Black and Latino borrowers. HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 14–16 
(finding that approximately 70 percent of Black college dropouts cite student debt as a 
primary reason for leaving school). 
 286. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 104 (citing studies). 
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college from mid-2014 to mid-2016, all carrying federal student 
debt.287 The emotional and financial effect can be dramatic; 
according to Robert Lowe, an education professor at Marquette 
University, “[i]f students end up in debt, end up without a degree, 
they end up damaged by the experience rather than expanded by 
it.”288 
Even for those who graduated, many find that student debt 
limits their major adult choices. That was particularly true in our 
sample. Ken eloquently explained: 
There’s this wonderful writer named John Scalzi who wrote 
an essay some years ago about being poor, about what it 
means to be poor. And he says one of the defining elements 
of being poor is paying for decisions you didn’t know you 
made years ago. That’s basically what I’m doing. I had no 
idea what I was getting myself into when I borrowed all of 
this money, that I was basically kind of determining my 
legacy in the United States, and here we are.289 
Approximately one-third of our sample recognized that their 
student debt affected their housing decisions and almost one in 
five commented that their student debt affected family decisions, 
like whether or when to get married or have children.290 
Of course, for many respondents, the financial cost of their 
higher education was well worth its value. For example, one 
asserted, “I’ve loaned my way up to an upper middle-class 
lifestyle,”291 another noted that the debt was “worth every 
penny,”292 and yet another recognized that the degree “increased 
my earning potential.”293 And for those who had negative feelings 
                                                     
 287. Jill Barshay, Federal Data Shows 3.9 Million Students Dropped Out of College 
with Debt in 2015 and 2016, HECHINGER REP. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://hechingerreport.org/ 
federal-data-shows-3-9-million-students-dropped-college-debt-2015-2016/ [https://perma.cc 
/WAT8-AGHU] (citing data from the U.S. Department of Education’s College Scorecard). 
 288. Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Dropouts Tell No Tales, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept./Oct. 2013, 
at 38, 39; Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role 
of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2008) (recognizing that home 
ownership does not inherently foster wealth development, positive social-psychological 
states, or stable neighborhoods and communities; rising delinquency rates suggest that 
home ownership and mortgage obligations can “undermine these objectives”). 
 289. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 290. Cheryl, Sarah, and Felix—highlighted in Section IV.B.1—are all included in 
those numbers. See also Kelchen, supra note 59, at 190–91 (cataloguing studies suggesting 
that there is at least a modest negative relationship between student loan debt and delayed 
adult outcomes, such as starting a family or buying a home). 
 291. Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017). 
 292. Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 293. Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017). 
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about their financial investment in higher education, many 
remained positive about the intrinsic value of their education.294 
It is impossible to know what the students’ financial lives 
would have been like absent a college degree. One cannot test that. 
One can only rely on the borrowers’ perceptions. It is those 
perceptions, however, that are critical to the student debt cascade 
because perception is what leads to distress emotions and 
avoidance. And several respondents perceived a clear and unfair 
disconnect between the investment they were promised and their 
financial reality. Ebony stated, “I don’t think education 
guarantees anything nowadays, unfortunately. Not like we 
thought it would. Not like we were told it would.”295 Shelly 
lamented: 
If I’m being honest, I think I’d have been better off going to 
trade school, and not going this route. Because you have, like 
I said, we have these illusions of what a bachelor’s degree 
would mean. And I don’t know, I don’t know if the payout 
now is worth, did I really get my money’s worth? Am I really 
capitalizing on anything that I got from this degree? And the 
answer would probably be no.296 
And Ken stated, “[o]ne of the reasons I freely borrowed so much 
money on behalf of school is because I believed, ultimately, it was 
for the greater good, and it turns out it’s actually been probably 
the most defining great evil of my life.”297 
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable evidence of distress 
emotions, including anxiety, fear, or shame298 in graduates and 
noncompleters who feel that their investment was, in some way, 
                                                     
 294. See, e.g., Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“[T]hat was the 
great value for me of going away [to college] . . . . Just meeting people different from me, 
and going to see more of the world.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 
2018) (“I think that [college] has been worth it. Like, ideologically and in terms of shaping 
my values. . . . And then, learning how to be engaged in the community. I feel like those are 
all important things.”); Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017) (“Just the 
experience, incredible. [College] changed my life. It did exactly what I needed it to do. I was 
looking for an escape from the crazy, it gave me the escape from the crazy. I was looking for 
a group of people who would push me, and I found that in spades. I looked to create a family 
and I created all kinds of family in this [college] community.”). 
 295. Interview with Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018). 
 296. Interview with Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 297. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). One respondent who went 
to law school described the outcome: “Investment wise, it’s a very bad investment.” 
Interview with California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018). 
 298. See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer 
Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2017, at 178, 195 (measuring emotions, 
including frustration, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, shame, and guilt in consumers who had 
filed narrative complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). 
 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) 
56 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:1 
lacking.299 For example, Carrie made the explicit connection 
between the sacrifices required by her education debt and distress 
emotions: 
I’ve definitely had those times in my life where I’ve been 
feeling like I’m not really even . . . like I’m trying to pay and 
I’m not living my life. I’m not able to go anywhere, or do 
[anything], because it’s like . . . I have to pay for this, and I’m 
stressed out about it, so I’m not very fun because I’m anxious 
about it.300  
Felix noted, “I think my experience with debt is probably very 
similar to a lot of folks. Again, as I read more I find that . . . 
crippling fear created by debt is incredibly commonplace.”301 Ken 
had a similar sentiment: “I think [my experience with education 
debt is] typical for millennials. Every millennial I know, or most of 
them, are working too hard, they’re stressed out, they’re angry, 
frustrated. They may or may not have substance abuse problems 
or mental health issues that are exacerbated by all of this.”302 
Others referenced sadness related to their education debt. Lindsey 
explained: 
I am making that kind of salary that should be going to 
retirement, and instead I’m paying down debt. That seems 
weird. That feels scary, and not great. And thinking 
about . . . anytime I think about just cooling down on the 
number of clients that I take or any of that, it’s just like this 
giant . . . it’s a tidal wave. It’s like, slow that down and this 
is just gonna completely consume you.303  
                                                     
 299. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 96 (citing a 2015 study finding that 
student loan debtors reported “lower levels of psychological health, controlling for other 
factors such as occupation, income, education, and family wealth”); Kristy L. Archuleta et 
al., College Students and Financial Distress: Exploring Debt, Financial Satisfaction, and 
Financial Anxiety, 24 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 50, 50–51 (2013) (finding that debt was 
not a statistically significant factor in students’ financial anxiety, but recognizing that 
“financial anxiety may not occur until after graduation when recent graduates face the 
realization of their debt and its impact on their financial situation.”); LeMay & Cloud, supra 
note 95, at 102 (“As one can see an endless cycle of despair and hopelessness can be created 
for those not prepared to repay their student loans.”). But cf. Dwyer et al., supra note 27, 
at 733–34 (longitudinal study of young adults on the relationship between accumulated 
debt, including education debt, and feelings of mastery and self-esteem, finding that (1) 
debt contributes to a greater sense of mastery and self-esteem for young adults because it 
represents reasoned investment in status attainment; (2) results are stronger for low- and 
middle-income borrowers and blunted for upper-income borrowers; and (3) positive 
attribution of debt decreases with age as the burdens of repayment begin to outweigh the 
positive feelings associated with consumption). 
 300. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018). 
 301. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 302. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 303. Interview with Texas Borrower Twelve (Feb. 19, 2018). Others share the same 
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Shame was also a connective tissue in the interviews. Sarah did 
not want to expose her student debt to her friends because she 
“would feel ashamed because I feel like they know me as somebody 
who works really, really hard. And then, if they knew . . . I 
wouldn’t want to make them feel sorry for me.”304 And at least 
three others talked about the shame of having debt and needing 
financial advice.305 
Distress emotions and shame can exacerbate the information 
ostrich effect.306 Approximately one in five respondents in our 
sample mentioned either: (1) that they would prefer not to think 
about their education debt; (2) that they did not feel comfortable 
discussing their debt or finances with others; or (3) both.307 
Distress emotions and related avoidance can lead borrowers to 
avoid dealing with the debt itself. A few comments are illustrative. 
Felix recalled, “the amount of debt was so much and so 
overwhelming I stopped checking my mail. I stopped engaging my 
e-mail. The bills, sometimes I had the money to pay and it was so 
overwhelming to engage that I just avoided it.”308 Andrew 
admitted, “[f]or a while I was trying to escape it. Basically, it’s been 
like this 800[-]pound gorilla on my back.”309 For many of our 
                                                     
sentiment. See Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with 
Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 304. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 305. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas 
Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017). 
 306. There has been a significant amount of research on stigma and avoidance in the 
bankruptcy field. See Alycia Chin et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Stigma: Understanding 
Relationships with Familiarity and Perceived Control, 53 J. CONSUMER AFF. 600, 613–14 
(2019) (finding that attitudes about bankruptcy and bankruptcy filers are affected by first-
hand experience, feelings of morality, warmth, and competence, and filer’s control of her 
financial circumstances); Sousa, supra note 130, at 460, 464–65 (interviews with debtors 
who filed bankruptcy showed a link between the stigma and shame of a debtor’s inability 
to pay her debt and a debtor’s decision to put off or avoid filing for bankruptcy); Deborah 
Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 
77, 83 (2006) (interviews with couples who filed bankruptcy evidenced a link between the 
shame of financial insecurity and avoiding filing for bankruptcy). 
 307. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with Illinois 
Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018); 
Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower 
Six (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with 
Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Two (Aug. 30, 
2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas 
Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017); 
Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Six 
(Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 308. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017). Another respondent echoed 
this sentiment. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Yeah, we’re 
dodging phone calls.”). 
 309. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018). 
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respondents, avoidance meant trying to defer or forbear their 
loans for as long as possible. At least twenty-nine of our sixty-five 
respondents mentioned placing their loans in deferment310  or 
forbearance,311 or otherwise failing to pay them.312 Sasha noted, 
“my biggest skill in life learning, in how to manage these loans is 
just to go back to school and avoid them. Because the longer I’m in 
school, the more I can defer them . . . . And I like being in school, 
so maybe I could just do this till I die.”313 At least eight of our 
respondents defaulted on their loans.314 
The student debt cascade, for these borrowers, ends with 
significant financial repercussions. For those who enter 
forbearance, interest continues to accrue and is capitalized into 
the principal of the loan at the end of the forbearance period.315 
                                                     
 310. Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with 
California Borrower Ten (Apr. 15, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 
2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois 
Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018); 
Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower 
Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with 
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with New York Borrower Five (Oct. 16, 
2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower One (Aug. 4, 2017); Interview with North 
Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr. 
4, 2018); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Seven (Apr. 5, 2018); Interview with 
Texas Borrower Five (Feb. 17, 2018). 
 311. Interview with California Borrower One (Apr. 13, 2018); Interview with 
California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 
14, 2018); Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017); Interview with New York 
Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with New York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017); 
Interview with North Carolina Borrower Six (Apr. 4, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower 
Two (Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018); Interview with 
Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). It was clear from the context of the interviews that 
the respondents were not clear about the difference between deferment and forbearance 
and of which program they had taken advantage. 
 312. Interview with California Borrower Two (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with 
California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018). 
 313. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018). 
 314. Although neither the survey nor the interviewers specifically asked about default, 
it became clear in certain interviews. See Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr. 
14, 2018); Interview with California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with 
California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 
2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Six (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower 
Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Three (Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with 
Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 
2018). 
 315. Forbearance, FED. STUDENT AID (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:09 PM), https://studentaidhelp 
.ed.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/295/~/forbearance [https://perma.cc/HQ27-F9CS] (“Unpaid 
interest that accrues during the forbearance will be added to the principal balance 
(capitalized) of your loan(s), increasing the total amount you owe”); see also AKERS & 
CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 119–20 (discussing allegations that student loan servicers have 
engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of borrowers, and otherwise failed borrowers when 
it comes to navigating repayment). 
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For many, this leads to a ballooning debt. Ken described his 
experience: 
I exhausted all of my deferments, forbearance, benefits. 
When I graduated the total amount of money owed was only 
like [forty-five] thousand dollars, but everything kept 
gaining interest for the next four years. By the time I was 
making payments, the total of everything was about 
[seventy-two] thousand, [seventy-four] thousand dollars.316  
For those who are more than ninety days delinquent on their 
loans, their credit rating suffers.317 And for those who do default, 
the financial toll of the collections process can be massive—the 
federal government can seize tax returns, social security 
payments, or earned income tax credits, garnish wages, or put a 
freeze on additional loan money or transcripts.318 According to one 
borrower who experienced such collection measures, they are 
“ugly, it’s disgusting” and “kind of like being treated like a 
second[-]class citizen.”319 A borrower’s credit can be destroyed, 
which can affect her ability to seek additional credit, buy or rent a 
home, or get a job.320 Especially in light of the fact that data have 
shown that the federal government expends more money collecting 
debt than it recovers,321 it is difficult to see the value in the 
punitive policies. Punitive and stigmatizing collection tools punish 
borrowers and may lead to further stigmatization and 
exacerbation of the student debt cascade.322 But the devastating 
individual outcomes are masked by the investment imperative, 
which prioritizes higher education above all else—even a lifetime 
of debt collection, stress, and shame. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The investment imperative is alive and well in America. It is 
baked in to federal higher education policy and woven into the 
fabric of higher education institutions. It drives prospective 
                                                     
 316. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018).  
 317. What is Delinquency?, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loa 
ns/default#delinquency [https://perma.cc/JMM3-RREW] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 318. Rendleman & Weingart, supra note 121, at 247–51. 
 319. Interview with Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018). 
 320. Greene, supra note 131, at 260–62 (discussing the increasing use of credit score 
and credit report as a gatekeeper for jobs, rental units, car insurance, and utility security 
deposits). 
 321. Shahien Nasiripour, Americans Are Paying $38 to Collect $1 of Student Debt, 
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 8:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05- 
19/americans-are-paying-38-to-collect-1-of-student-debt.  
 322. Like the scholarly work around stigma in bankruptcy, see supra note 306, it is 
necessary to engage in more quantitative, qualitative, and interdisciplinary work to 
understand the role of shame and stigma in higher education financing and debt collection. 
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students toward higher education and justifies the current credit-
based financing of higher education. And it drives and distorts 
consumer decision-making around higher education and student 
debt. The way that the investment imperative has driven higher 
education policy and distorted consumers’ decisions has 
consequences, the negative effects of which are disproportionally 
experienced by vulnerable communities that have historically had 
less equal access to higher education and other avenues to 
financial and social mobility. Those consequences and effects are 
not simply theoretical; they have a real effect on real people. By 
combining theoretical and empirical research with qualitative 
data, this Article sheds light on how the investment imperative 
affects individuals on the ground.323 
This contribution is just a beginning, adding a legal 
perspective to an interdisciplinary conversation; scholars from 
across disciplines are newly engaged in the project of exploring 
how the legal requirements and structures of higher education 
affect students, particularly those who rely on credit to finance 
their education. As higher education becomes more expensive, less 
regulated, and more critical to success in the labor market, it is 
more important than ever to understand the full implications of 
the investment imperative.324 If policymakers want to deal with 
the student debt crisis, they must understand how the current 
framework drives and distorts decisions on both the supply and 
demand side. Thus, the data and arguments presented in this 
Article offer an important, and underrepresented, perspective. 
 
                                                     
 323. Greene, supra note 131, at 242 (“What is often absent from [theoretical] accounts, 
however, is what we can glean only by engaging in in-depth interviews with those directly 
affected by the legal rules, systems, and processes we study: an understanding of how, in 
their actual social contexts, these actors experience, understand, and internalize the 
relevant legal rules and structures, and how these structures become sources of personal 
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 324. There is much more work to be done to understand the full effects of the 
investment imperative. Query, for example, whether the investment imperative provides 
justification for constricting the social safety net or otherwise limiting programs that aid 
the poor and middle-class. The argument would proceed as follows: Through education debt, 
the government makes higher education accessible to the majority of Americans. Higher 
education is the key to upward socioeconomic mobility. Therefore, individual Americans 
simply need to take advantage of the access to achieve socioeconomic success. Thus, there 
is no need for a strong social safety net. Of course, for the reasons explained herein—
information asymmetry, exploitation of vulnerable borrowers, illegal or unethical conduct 
by lenders or servicers, systemic and institutional barriers, lack of equal or fair access, 
unequal debt loads, and labor market changes—we know that access to higher education is 
insufficient to level the economic playing field. Yet, until we recognize the full effects of the 
investment imperative, access to higher education will be stymied in its efforts to displace 
systemic or institutional inequalities. 
